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109 VA. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2023)

THE NEW MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE
DANIEL T. DEACON* & LEAH M. LITMAN†
This article critically analyzes significant recent developments in the major questions doctrine. It highlights important shifts in what role the majorness of an agency
policy plays in statutory interpretation, as well as changes in how the Court determines
whether an agency policy is major. After the Supreme Court’s October 2021 term,
the “new” major questions doctrine operates as a clear statement rule that directs
courts not to discern the plain meaning of a statute using the normal tools of statutory interpretation, but to require explicit and specific congressional authorization
for certain agency policies. Even broadly worded, otherwise unambiguous statutes
do not appear good enough when it comes to policies the Court deems “major.”
At the same time, the Court has increasingly relied on three new indicia of “majorness” to determine whether an agency rule is major. These include the political
significance of or political controversy surrounding an agency policy; the novelty
of a policy—i.e., the fact that the agency had never announced a similar policy before; and other, theoretically possible agency policies that might be supported by
the agency’s broader statutory rationale.
Understanding how the major questions doctrine operates today is important
not only to bring a modicum of clarity to a doctrine often described as radically
indeterminate. Unpacking the new major questions doctrine also provides a way to
interrogate and evaluate the new major questions doctrine on its own purportedly
formalist terms and to assess how the doctrine relates to previously understood
institutional and political pathologies. The Court’s new approach allows political
parties and political movements more broadly to effectively amend otherwise broad
regulatory statutes outside of the formal legislative process by generating controversy surrounding an agency policy. The new major questions doctrine provides
additional mechanisms for polarization by judicially solidifying polarization into the
courts’ interpretation of statutes. It supplies an additional means for minority rule
in a constitutional system that already skews toward minority rule. And it operates
as a powerful deregulatory tool that limits or substantially nullifies congressional
delegations to agencies in the circumstances where delegations are more likely to
be used, and more likely to be effective.
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INTRODUCTION
Stymieing agency efforts to address issues from climate change to the COVID19 pandemic,1 the major questions doctrine has emerged as a powerful weapon
wielded against the administrative state.2 The doctrine’s roots extend as far back as

1 See West Virginia v. Envt’l Protection Agency, __ S. Ct. __, 2022 WL 2347278 (June
30, 2022) (invoking major questions doctrine to invalidate EPA regulation designed to curb
emissions from greenhouse gasses); Nat’l Federation of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Labor, 142
S. Ct. 661 (2022) (invoking major questions doctrine to invalidate OSHA regulation designed to address COVID-19).
2 See, e.g., Alison Gocke, Chevron’s Next Chapter: A Fig Leaf for the Nondelegation Doctrine,
55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 955, 994 (2022) (“The legal fictions underlying the major questions
doctrine (specifically, the ‘major questions doctrine as Chevron step zero test’) and Chief
Justice Roberts’ jurisdictional exception are poised to become the Court’s new nondelegation tests.”); Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1938 (2017)
(arguing that the Court’s earlier major questions arrogated power to courts and away from
administrative agencies).
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1994 and arguably before.3 But its shape has morphed significantly over time.4 Most
recently, the Supreme Court’s October 2021 term saw the doctrine become
stronger, more powerful. At the same time, the Court more fully articulated its vision of when the doctrine applies. And at least one thing has become crystal clear:
the major questions doctrine has become an important—perhaps the most important—constraint on agency power, particularly when it comes to some of the
most pressing problems of our time.
This article critically analyzes significant recent developments in the major questions doctrine. It highlights important shifts in what role the majorness of an agency
policy plays in statutory interpretation, as well as changes in how the Court determines
whether an agency policy is major. The major questions doctrine originally operated
to shed light on the meaning of a statute.5 When an agency promulgated a policy
that was dramatic or unexpected, the broader context of the statute, consulted in
conjunction with common sense, might indicate that Congress did not intend to
license that policy.6 In such form, the major questions doctrine (a phrase the Court
did not use until last term) was one tool of statutory interpretation among equals.
It supplied one piece of evidence—alongside tools such as ordinary meaning, statutory history, and the semantic canons—about the meaning of statutory language
read in its overall context.
But it has become something quite different. First, in King v. Burwell, the Court
used the doctrine as a reason why courts should determine the meaning of statutory
language without deference to the agency’s views.7 And now, after the October
2021 term, the “new” major questions doctrine operates as a clear statement rule.8
It directs courts not to discern the plain meaning of a statute using the normal tools
of statutory interpretation, but instead to require explicit and specific congressional
authorization for certain agency policies.9 Even broadly worded, otherwise unambiguous statutes do not appear good enough when it comes to policies the Court
deems “major.”
See Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND. L. REV.
777, 787 (2017) (“Though it had precursors, the majorness inquiry first crystallized in FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. [(1994)].”).
4 E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, There Are Two “Major Questions” Doctrines, 73 ADMIN. L. REV.
475, 480-82 (2021) (arguing that the Court has deployed two different formulations of the
doctrine).
5 See Coenen & Davis, supra note 3, at 788-91 (describing doctrinal origins and operation).
6 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); In a slightly
different form, the doctrine operated to inform the courts’ analysis of whether the agency’s
interpretation was a reasonable one. See Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Envt’l Protection
Agency, 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
7 576 U.S. 473 (2015).
8 See West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at *24 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (describing the
Court’s articulation of the major questions doctrine as a clear statement rule); id. at *38
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing the major questions doctrine as a “get-out-of-text-free
card[]”).
9 See id. at *38 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
3
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At the same time, the Court has increasingly relied on three indicia of “majorness,” in addition to the costs imposed by the agency policy, to determine whether
an agency rule is major. First, the Court has indicated that politically significant or
controversial policies are more likely to be major and thus require clear authorization.10 Second, the Court has signaled that the novelty of a policy—i.e., the fact that
the agency had never announced a similar policy before—is a reason to conclude
that the policy is a major one.11 Finally, the Court has considered the “majorness”
of other, theoretically possible agency policies not actually before the Court but
that might be supported by the agency’s broader rationale in determining whether
the agency’s current claim of interpretive authority is major.12 Again, none of these
considerations are reliable proxies or indicators for statutory meaning. But together,
they operate as a powerful deregulatory tool and exacerbate several institutional and
political pathologies in the constitutional system.13
This new major questions doctrine was most clearly on display in the Supreme
Court’s end-of-term blockbuster decision in West Virginia v. EPA.14 There, the
Court invoked the major questions doctrine to invalidate an EPA regulation that
required coal-fired power plants to adopt so-called “generation-shifting” methods
in order to shift production to cleaner sources of electricity.15 The case was the first
time the Court actually used the phrase “major questions doctrine,” and it represents the full emergence of the doctrine as a clear-statement rule.16 The consequence is that “major” agency policies now require “clear congressional authorization.”17 And the Court made clear that even broadly worded, general grants of
See NFIB, 142 S. Ct. at 665 (quoting Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021)); West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at *22 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (explaining that an issue may be major where “certain States were
considering” the issue or “when Congress and state legislatures were engaged in robust
debates”); id. at *16 (majority op.).
11 See West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at *13-14 (invoking novelty of the regulation as
an indicia of majorness); NFIB, 142 S. Ct. at 666 (“This ‘lack of historical precedent,’ coupled with the breadth of authority that the Secretary now claims, is a ‘telling indication’ that
the mandate extends beyond the agency’s legitimate reach.” (quoting Free Enterprise Fund
v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
12 See Alabama Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489 (using implications of agency’s theory
of authority as indicia of majorness).
13 Cf. West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at *38 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Today, one of
those broader goals makes itself clear: Prevent agencies from doing important work, even
though that is what Congress directed. That anti-administrative-state stance shows up in
the majority opinion, and it suffuses the concurrence.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s
Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-28 (2017).
14 2022 WL 2347278.
15 See id.; Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64510-01, 64728
(Oct. 23, 2015).
16 West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at *13. Justice Gorsuch labeled the doctrine as a
clear statement rule in his concurrence. See id. at *18 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
17 See id. at *17.
10
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authority are not enough to supply such authorization. Indeed, the Court conceded
that “generation shifting” methods “can be described as a ‘system,’” the relevant
language in the statute.18 Much more important to the Court was the policy’s perceived majorness and the fact that it lacked specific congressional approval.
West Virginia also displayed the Court’s new indicia of majorness—the criteria
used to assess whether the doctrine applies. The Court made clear that the “political
significance” of a rule is evidence of majorness,19 and it pointed to political disagreement over whether to adopt generation-shifting programs.20 The concurrence,
which agreed with the Court’s application of the major questions doctrine, underscored that the agency’s rule was major because “certain States were considering”
the issue and “Congress and state legislatures were engaged in robust debates.”21
The Court also invoked the novelty of the agency’s regulatory approach in finding
it to be a major one,22 and it considered the possible future implications of the
agency’s theory of its statutory authority.23
Understanding how the major questions doctrine operates today is important
not only to bring a modicum of clarity to a doctrine often described as radically
indeterminate.24 Unpacking the new major questions doctrine also provides a way
to interrogate and evaluate the new major questions doctrine on its own purportedly formalist terms and to assess how it relates to previously understood institutional and political pathologies. And we will suggest that, judged in this manner, the
doctrine does quite poorly.
This article makes three principal contributions. The first is descriptive and synthetic: The article offers the first account of how the new major questions doctrine
Id.
19 Id. at *11 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 15960 (2000)).
20 Id. at * 16 (“‘The importance of the issue,’ along with the fact that the same basic
scheme EPA adopted ‘has been the subject of an earnest and profound debate across the
country, ... makes the oblique form of the claimed delegation all the more suspect.’ (quoting
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267-68 (2006)).
21 Id. at *22 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
22 See id. at *13-14.
23 See id. at *15 (“[T]his argument does not so much limit the breadth of the Government’s claimed authority as reveal it.”).
24 See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 1938-84, 1986-90 (describing uncertainty in the
major questions doctrine); Gocke, supra note 2, at 1003 (describing the major questions
doctrine as “illusory”); Coenen & Davis, supra note 3, at 809-10 (describing lack of clarity
in the major questions doctrine); Jonas J. Mast, Major Questions About the Major Questions
Doctrine, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 448 (2016) (“More is unclear than clear about the bounds
of the major questions doctrine at this stage.”); Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding
Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19, 45 (2010) (describing a related interpretive principle as “haphazard”); Natasha Brunstein & Richard L. Revesz, Mangling the Major
Questions Doctrine, 74 ADMIN. L. REV. 217, 218 (2022) (“What constitutes a major question
is as unclear today as it was when Justice Breyer wrote those words in 1986.”); Nathan
Richardson, Antideference, __ VA. L. REV. ONLINE __ (forthcoming 2022), manuscript at p.
17 (“The most significant and longstanding critique of the major questions doctrine is that
its boundaries are unclear, unpredictable, and maybe arbitrary.”).
18
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operates in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions from October term 2021. It
shows how the new major questions doctrine functions as a clear statement rule
that flips the normal Chevron analysis on its head: Instead of deferring to reasonable
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, the new major questions doctrine
holds that even broad, otherwise unambiguous delegations of authority are not
enough to support “major” agency policies. The article also excavates the considerations that trigger the application of the major questions doctrine. It shows that
the new major questions doctrine places focus on political disagreement about the
policy in question, considers whether the agency’s policy represents a novel regulatory approach, and invites courts to conjecture about the potential parade of horribles that may result from the agency’s claim of interpretive authority.
The article’s second contribution is analytic: Identifying how the Court assesses
majorness makes it easier to evaluate the new major questions doctrine and to critically assess its likely consequences. Specifically, we suggest that the Court’s new
approach allows political parties—or political movements more broadly—to effectively amend otherwise broad regulatory statutes by generating controversy surrounding an agency policy. In other words, if a policy is sufficiently “controversial”
due to political resistance, the major questions doctrine operates to effectively narrow the scope of agencies’ authority outside the normal legislative process. This
dynamic undermines the purported purpose of the doctrine, which is to channel
policy disputes into legislatures.
The third contribution is more broadly conceptual and normative: Unpacking
the new major questions doctrine identifies points of connection between the doctrine and previously identified pathologies of the American constitutional system.
The new major questions doctrine provides additional mechanisms for polarization—indeed, it judicially solidifies polarization into the courts’ interpretation of
statutes.25 And it supplies an additional means for minority rule in a constitutional
system that already skews toward minority rule. In these respects and others, the
new major questions doctrine exacerbates several important institutional and political pathologies.
Now is an especially important time to unpack and assess the major questions
doctrine. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s
Health Organization overruling Roe v. Wade,26 the federal government is reportedly
considering and undertaking some administrative responses to secure access to
abortion, particularly medication abortion.27 Possible responses include regulatory

Cf. Coenen & Davis, supra note 3, at 831 (arguing that lower courts application of
the version of the major questions doctrine articulated in King v. Burwell raised “concerns
about major political dysfunction and institutional breakdowns”).
26 __ S. Ct. __, 2022 WL 2276808 (June 24, 2022), overruling Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
27 See Shira Stein, Fiona Rutherford, and Celine Castronuovo, White House Touts Abortion Pill a Answer to Roe Reversal But FDA Rules Limit Use, Bloomberg (June 30, 2022),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-30/white-house-touts-abortionpill-as-answer-to-roe-reversal-but-fda-rules-limit-use; Dan Diamond & Rachel Roubein,
Biden official vows action on abortion following ‘despicable’ ruling, Washington Post (June 28, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/06/28/abortion-access-becerra/.
25
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action by the Food and Drug Administration,28 and declarations of public health
emergencies under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act.29 Both
responses rely on statutory delegations to agencies.30 These agency responses may
be evaluated under the major questions doctrine, making it important to understand
what the doctrine is and how it might be applied.31
The article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides a brief overview of different
judicial constraints on administrative agencies’ authority to interpret and implement
federal statutes. Part II provides a synthesis of the new major questions doctrine,
focusing on three recent cases, two from the Supreme Court’s most recent term
and the third from August 2021. Part III then critically evaluates the new major
questions doctrine. It argues that the new major questions doctrine undermines the
purported formalist basis for the doctrine and exacerbates known pathologies of
the constitutional system. The doctrine also effectively hobbles congressional delegations in situations where the benefits of delegation are most clear. This complicates claims that the major questions doctrine may actually work to protect the
Chevron framework and the administrative state.32 We conclude by illustrating how
the new major questions doctrine undermines not only the effectiveness of delegation, but also erodes the conceptual, theoretical justifications for the administrative
state.
I.

JUDICIAL CONSTRAINTS ON ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY

This Part identifies three doctrinal mechanisms that may limit the authority of
federal administrative agencies. Part I.A discusses two limitations that constrain the
agency’s power to interpret and implement statutes as a matter of statutory interpretation; Part I.B discusses a third limitation—constitutional in form—that would

28 See U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Mifeprex (mifepristone) Information,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/postmarket-drug-safety-information-patients-and-providers/mifeprex-mifepristone-information; Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS)
Single Shared System for Mifepristone 200MG, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
drugsatfda_docs/rems/Mifepristone_2019_04_11_REMS_Document.pdf.
29 42 U.S.C. § 247-6d.
30 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-751, APPROVAL AND
OVERSIGHT OF THE DRUG MIFEPREX 5 (2008), https://www.gao.gov/assets/
280/279424.pdf; Memorandum entitled NDA 20-687 Mifeprex (mifepristone) Population
Council,
at
1
(Sept.
28,
2000),
http://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/
20170113112743/http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/
PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm111366.pdf; 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1),
(f)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), (d); 42 U.S.C. § 247-6d.
31 Complaint, Texas v. Becerra, No. 5:22-cv-00185, Dkt No. 1 (July 14, 2022),
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Texas-Complaint.pdf
(complaint challenging Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Becerra’s
post-Dobbs guidance on major questions grounds).
32 See, e.g., Nathan Richardson, Keeping Big Cases From Making Bad Law: The Resurgent
Major Questions Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REV. 355 (2016).
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constrain Congress’s ability to authorize agencies to interpret and implement statutes.
A. Limitations on Chevron: Statutory Interpretation as Constraint on Agencies
The Court has used tools and rules about statutory interpretation to limit agencies’ authority to interpret and implement statutes. These limitations largely relate
to the “Chevron” framework. Under that framework, courts are generally supposed
to defer to administrative agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions they administer.33 The formal doctrinal articulation of the Chevron
framework has two steps.34 The first asks “whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue.”35 If Congress has directly spoken to the issue,
courts follow Congress’s directives. If, however, the statute is ambiguous, courts
proceed to the second step, at which point they are supposed to defer to the
agency’s interpretation of the statute so long as the agency’s interpretation is a “permissible” or reasonable one.”36
More recently, the Chevron framework has fallen out of favor with the Court’s
Republican-appointed Justices.37 The Court has accordingly relied on two doctrinal
approaches to statutory interpretation that operate to limit Chevron, but without
formally overruling it.
One method of constraining Chevron is by embracing a kind of interpretive hegemony—the Court insists that, when deployed properly, the Court’s methods of
statutory interpretation resolve statutory ambiguity and that a statutory provision
has a single meaning, sometimes without even citing Chevron or relying on its framework.38 Thus, the Court simply declines to conclude that the statute is ambiguous
or that Congress has not spoken to the precise question and resolves the interpretive question itself rather than allowing an agency to do so. Although sometimes
the Court’s interpretation of the statute may be the same as an agency’s, this method
of interpretation still reduces agencies’ interpretive authority because it permits

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
Scholars have argued that there are three steps to Chevron, including a “Step Zero,”
which asks some variation of the question of whether Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority over a given issue to an agency. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92
VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). Some of the early major questions cases were sometimes understood to fit within this threshold inquiry. Cass R. Sunstein, There Are Two “Major Questions”
Doctrines, 73 ADMIN. L. REV. 475, 480-82 (2021). Matthew Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule argued that Chevron has only one step – asking whether the agency’s interpretation
of the statute is reasonable. Matthew Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only
One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009).
35 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
36 Id. at 843.
37 E.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
38 See, e.g., American Hospital Association v. Becerra, 142 S. Ct. 1896 (2022) (maintaining that the Court was “employing the traditional tools of statutory interpretation” to determine whether to uphold the agency’s interpretation of the statute).
33
34
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agencies to arrive only at a single interpretation of the statute. It does not allow
agencies to choose among competing reasonable interpretations.
Taken at face value, there’s nothing particularly odd about courts finding statutes
to be unambiguous—it’s a possibility whenever the Chevron framework is deployed.
What’s more striking is the frequency with which the Supreme Court in particular
has found statutes to have only a single, unambiguous meaning in recent terms. In
several cases, the Court concluded that Congress had directly spoken to the precise
question in ways that ran counter to the agency’s interpretation of the statute. In
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, for example, the Court interpreted the Fair Labor
Standards Act and held that service advisors at car dealerships were not “salesm[e]n,
partsm[e]n, or mechanic[s] primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles”
under the FLSA, and therefore the agency could not interpret the statute to cover
the service advisers. (If the statute did cover service advisers, they would have been
entitled to overtime compensation.39) Similarly, in Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, the
Court interpreted the Immigration and Nationality Act to conclude that the California offense of “unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three
years younger than the perpetrator” did not qualify as “sexual abuse of a minor”
under the Immigration and Nationality Act as the Bureau of Immigration Appeals
had concluded. As a result, a conviction under the California statute therefore did
not make noncitizens eligible for deportation and removal.40 In both of these cases,
the Court deployed the tools it uses to interpret statutes to conclude that a statute
was not ambiguous and foreclosed the agency’s contrary interpretation of the statute.
But the Court has also used a similar tactic even when it agrees with an agency’s
interpretation of a statute. Here, rather than concluding that the agency’s interpretation is a permissible, reasonable construction of an ambiguous provision, the
Court instead interprets the statute itself as effectively requiring the agency’s view.
Thus, in Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation, the Court concluded that individuals
who were eligible for Medicare, but who did not necessarily have all or part of their
hospitals stays covered by Medicare, counted for purposes of determining a hospital’s eligibility for a disproportionate share adjustment under Medicare.41 The Department of Health and Human Services had taken that view, but rather than deferring to DHHS’s interpretation of the statute, the Court stated simply that the
regulation “correctly construes the statutory language.”42 That phrasing is curious
because, under Chevron, the agency’s interpretation would not have to be correct; in
order to be upheld, it would just have to be reasonable. Thus, what the Court appeared to be saying—without really saying it—was that the statute was unambiguously in the agency’s favor.
In this first set of cases, no matter whether they reject or uphold an agency’s
interpretation of a statute, courts do not explicitly take the interpretive issues outside of the Chevron framework. Rather, the cases purport to interpret the statutes
without disavowing or rejecting the applicability of the Chevron framework. The
138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018).
137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
41 __ S. Ct. __, 2022 WL 2276810 (June 24, 2022).
42 Id. at *6.
39
40
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second way of constraining agencies’ authority to interpret and implement statutes
more expressly modifies the normal Chevron framework. In these cases, the Court
has suggested either that the issue should not be analyzed using the Chevron framework because Congress did not authorize agencies to resolve a major issue,43 or that
the Chevron analysis operates differently because of the agency policy is a major one.
In this respect, these cases operate somewhat in tension with the Chevron framework, rather than being ordinary applications of it.44
These cases have come to be known as the major questions doctrine. Though it
has roots in earlier cases such as AT&T v. MCI and Benzene, the major questions
inquiry was clearly incorporated into the Chevron framework in FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp.45 There, the Court concluded that “Congress has directly
spoken to the question” of whether the Food and Drug Administration had the
authority to regulate tobacco products under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
The Court held that the FDA did not have that authority; as part of that analysis,
the Court explained that the Court’s analysis at step one of Chevron was “shaped, at
least in some measure, by the nature of the question presented,” which the Court
described as whether the FDA had the authority “to ban cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco,” the sale of which constituted a major sector of the American economy.46
Notably, the Court made these statements only after seeming to conclude that the
statute unambiguously foreclosed on other grounds. And the reasons it gave for its
skepticism still sounded in congressional intent: In the Court’s view, the FDCA’s
context read in conjunction with other statutes passed by Congress and perhaps a
dose of common sense, revealed that Congress did not really intend to authorize
something as “major” as the banning of tobacco productions, which the Court took
to be the consequence of the FDA’s position.47
Subsequently, in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, the Court also seemed to
articulate the major questions doctrine in something resembling traditional Chevron
terms. In that case, the Court evaluated EPA’s conclusion that various greenhouse
gases were “air pollutants” for purposes of two Clean Air Act programs and that
major stationary sources of greenhouse gas therefore had to comply with those
programs’ requirements.48 After finding that the statute was ambiguous in the relevant respect, the Court concluded that the agency’s interpretation was “unreasonable”—seemingly at Step Two of Chevron—because it “would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear

This thread reflected, in part, the intentionalist strand of “Chevron step Zero,” which
asked whether Congress had delegated to an agency the authority to act with the force of
law. See United States v. Mead Corp, 553 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill &
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836-37 (2001); Sunstein, Step
Zero, supra note 34, at 187.
44 See Coenen & Davis, supra note 3, at 787-90, 791-96.
45 As other scholars have noted, there were precursors including MCI Telecomms Corp.
v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994), and Benzene. See Coenen & Davis, supra note 3, at 787.
46 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 120, 159-60.
47 See id.
48 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
43
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congressional authorization” and have significant implications on “the national
economy.”49
Whereas the Court in Brown & Williamson and Utility Air Regulatory Group seemed
to resolve matters within the Chevron framework, in King v. Burwell the Court appeared to alter the doctrine so that it operated to take questions wholly outside
Chevron. In that case, the Court addressed the Internal Revenue Service’s position
that it was authorized to issue tax credits to individuals who had purchased health
insurance on federally run health insurance exchanges. Early in its opinion, the
Court concluded that the IRS’s interpretation was not entitled to Chevron deference.
Issuing tax credits would involve “billions of dollars in spending each year and affect[] the price of health insurance for millions of people.”50 Moreover, in the
Court’s view, the IRS was not particularly expert on the matter.51 On those grounds,
the Court announced that it would not defer to the IRS’s view and would undertake
the statutory interpretation analysis de novo. Applying de novo review, the Court
found that the statute was ambiguous regarding the availability of tax credits on
federal exchanges but that statutory purpose favored their availability.52 The Court
thus authorized the expenditure of the very same billions of dollars in expenditures
that had been the grounds for denying the agency deference. The major questions
doctrine did not factor into the Court’s own, independent analysis.
Brown & Williamson, UARG, and King differ from each other in certain respects,
but they also share important similarities. Most importantly, none of those cases
purported to conclude that a statute unambiguously granting the agency the authority in question in fact required something more. In Brown & Williamson, the Court
had seemed to conclude that the statute unambiguously foreclosed the agency’s
interpretation prior to turning to the major questions doctrine. UARG found the
statute neither unambiguously commanded nor precluded the agency’s interpretation before concluding that it was nevertheless unreasonable. And in King, the
Court ultimately accepted the agency’s interpretation (albeit without granting the
agency deference) after finding that the statute was ambiguous and turning to purpose. That similarity serves to highlight one major difference between how the
major questions doctrine has been deployed in the past and how it looks coming
out of October term 2021. But before turning back to the major questions doctrine,
it’s necessary to briefly discuss one further limit on agencies’ authority.
B. Non-Delegation: Constitutional Law as Constraint
Another tool the Court might use to constrain agencies’ authority to interpret
and implement statutes is the nondelegation doctrine. While the nondelegation doctrine has only been used in two cases that were decided in a single year, the doctrine

Id. at 322-24.
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 2496.
49
50

DRAFT

11

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4165724

11

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 239 [2022]

has found a receptive and interested audience among several Justices on the current
Supreme Court.53
Under the nondelegation doctrine, Congress may not delegate its legislative
power. But for almost 150 years after the founding, the federal courts did not invalidate statutes on the ground that they delegated too much authority to establish
rules or regulations.54 Then, in 1935, the Court invalidated two federal statutes on
nondelegation grounds.55 In Panama Reining Co. v. Ryan, the Court held that a provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutionally delegated authority to the President to prohibit the transportation of oils taken above established
quotas.56 And in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp v. United States, the Court held unconstitutional another provision in the National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing
the President to approve “codes of fair competition” proposed by certain trade
associations.57
Since those cases, the Court has not invalidated any statute on the ground that it
delegates too much power to other entities. The Court has instead used a deferential
test to determine whether a delegation is excessive: Congress need only provide an
intelligible principle to guide the agency’s discretion, and most statutory guidance
will count. Indeed, the Court has found that merely directing agencies to regulate
in the public interest or to adopt standards requisite to protect the public health
suffice as intelligible principles.58
The Justices’ renewed interest in policing congressional delegations to agencies
became evident in Gundy v. United States.59 Gundy rejected a nondelegation challenge
to a provision of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act that authorized the Attorney General to apply the requirements of the Act to persons convicted of sex offenses before SORNA was enacted. Writing for a plurality of four
Justices, Justice Kagan applied the intelligible principle standard and also defended
it.60 In dissent, Justice Gorsuch indicated he would have overruled the intelligible
principle standard and placed greater limits on Congress’s ability to delegate issues
to agencies.61 In that conclusion Gorsuch was joined by Justice Thomas and Chief
Justice Roberts.62 Justice Alito voted to reject the nondelegation challenge in Gundy,
but he expressed an openness to revisiting the intelligible principle standard in a
future case when doing so would not result in an evenly divided Court (the Court
53 Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L.
REV. 277, 278-79 (2021).
54 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 53, at 282-83; Keith E. Whittingon & Jason Iuliano,
The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 422-24 (2017).
55 The Court expressed nondelegation concerns about another statute that it invalidated on commerce clause grounds. Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 311-12 (1996).
56 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935).
57 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935).
58 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473-76 (2001).
59 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
60 Id. at 2123, 2129-30 (opinion of Kagan, J.).
61 Id. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
62 Id.
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heard oral argument in the case before Justice Kavanaugh was confirmed).63 Subsequently, in a statement regarding a denial of certiorari in another case, Justice
Kavanaugh indicated an openness to reviving the nondelegation doctrine.64
Whereas the statutory interpretation cases conclude that Congress has not authorized an agency to interpret or implement a statute in a particular way, the nondelegation doctrine maintains that Congress sometimes cannot invest agencies with
power. In particular, Congress cannot invest agencies with authority without supplying them with adequate limits on their discretion. Just what those limits are may
well change in the coming years.
II.

A NEW CONSTRAINT: THE NEW MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE

This Part unpacks the three most recent cases in which the Court has used the
major questions doctrine, all from the October term 2021 or the summer before.
It shows how the Court appears to be using the major questions doctrine not as
one tool among many to interpret a statute, but rather as rule that alters the very
enterprise of statutory interpretation. It also highlights how the Court assesses
whether a policy is major. Part II.A unpacks the cases; Part II.B synthesizes and
compares them to previous major questions cases and other ways of constraining
agencies’ interpretive authority.
A. The Evolving Major Questions Doctrine
This Part discusses the evolution of the major questions doctrine over October
term 2021. That evolution was precipitated by a challenge to the Center for Disease
Control’s eviction moratorium, and it continued on through challenges to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s test-or-vaccine policy and the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority to tackle climate change under the Clean
Air Act.
1. CDC Eviction Moratorium
The Court’s refashioning of the major questions doctrine began with a case challenging the Center for Disease Control’s moratorium on evictions—a policy created as a response to the coronavirus pandemic.65 The Public Health Service Act
authorizes the Surgeon General, with the approval of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services:
to make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or

Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
64 Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari).
65 Alabama Association of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021).
63
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possession. For purposes of carrying out and enforcing such regulations, the Surgeon General may provide for such inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, destruction
of animals or articles found to be so infected or contaminated as to
be sources of dangerous infection to human beings, and other
measures, as in his judgment may be necessary.66
In the challenge, the six Justices appointed by Republican presidents all (apparently) concluded that the Public Health Service Act did not authorize the CDC to
establish an eviction moratorium on evictions in high-transmission areas as the
pandemic entered into one of its spikes.67 In the section discussing the merits of
the challenge, the Court started with a single paragraph asserting that the “broad
authority” granted to the CDC in the statute’s first sentence was narrowed by the
statute’s second sentence, which listed particular measures the CDC could take to
control diseases.68 That paragraph contains the extent of the Court’s interpretation
of the statute without reference to the major questions doctrine.
After acknowledging the statutory text, the Court framed the next several paragraphs around its articulation of the major questions doctrine, seemingly as something like an alternative basis for the Court’s holding. The Court declared that
“[e]ven if the text were ambiguous,” “the sheer scope of the CDC’s claimed authority … would counsel against the Government’s interpretation.” That is because, the Court explained, the Court “expect[s] Congress to speak clearly when
authorizing an agency to exercise powers of ‘vast economic and political significance.’”69
The Court then spent paragraph after paragraph explaining why it believed the
eviction moratorium compromised various constitutional values, apparently to explain why the issue or rule in the case was major.70 The Court explained that the
“‘vast economic … significance’” of the moratorium stemmed in part from the
“financial burden[s] on landlords.”71 But the Court also pointed to the potentially
dramatic future consequences that may occur if the agency’s assertion of authority
was upheld. The Court claimed that, under the Government’s interpretation, “It is
42 U.S.C. 264(a).
The decision was a per curiam opinion issued on the shadow docket and the only
three Justices noting their dissents were Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
68 2021 WL 3783142, at *3.
69 Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489
(2021).
70 In balancing the equities in the case, the Court asserted that “preventing [landlords]
from evicting tenants who breach their leases intrudes on one of the most fundamental
elements of property ownership—the right to exclude.” Id. The Court also claimed that
the moratorium implicated values of federalism and intruded on states’ authority, since the
states primarily regulate “the landlord-tenant relationship.” Id. The Court explained that
“Our precedents require Congress to enact exceedingly clear language if it wishes to significantly alter the balance between federal and state power and the power of the Government over private property.” Id. (quoting United States Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Preservation Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. 1837, 1850 (2020)).
71 Id.
66
67
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hard to see what measures this interpretation would place outside the CDC’s
reach,” since “the Government has identified no limit in § 361(a) beyond the requirement that the CDC deem a measure ‘necessary.’”72 The Court also relied on
the novelty of the moratorium as an indication of its majorness: The Court noted
that the moratorium was “unprecedented,” even though there has not been a similar pandemic since 1944, when the statute was enacted.73
In some ways, the eviction moratorium case was in line with major questions
cases that came before. For one, the Court claimed that the text leaned against the
agency even absent invocation of the major questions doctrine. But part of what is
notable about the opinion was the relative space given to ostensibly interpretive
tools—reading the grant of authority to the CDC in light of the statute’s specific
examples of measures the agency could take—versus the Court’s reasons for concluding the rule was major, such as the novelty of the regulation and the breadth of
the Government’s theory of agency authority. The former modes of analysis speak
to the meaning of the text; the latter, by contrast, may not—they instead provide
substantive reasons why the Court should avoid interpreting the text in a particular
way. And the relative airtime given to the latter compared to the former suggested
that the Court’s proffered reasons for skepticism of the agency’s regulation had
considerable sway in the outcome.
2. Vaccine Cases
The major questions doctrine appeared to be an even more significant driver of
the Supreme Court’s decision regarding the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s emergency temporary standard issued in response to the COVID-19
pandemic. The standard required indoor workplaces with more than 100 employees
to adopt a testing and masking regimen, or, alternatively, establish a vaccination
requirement.74 The Court stayed the OSHA regulation, and both the per curiam
majority opinion and Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence relied heavily on the idea that
the rule represented a major policy requiring particularly clear authorization. Of
note, one of the main reasons that the opinions treated the policy as major was
because it was politically controversial nature.
Enacted in 1970, the Occupational Safety and Health Act “authoriz[ed] the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory occupational safety and health standards applicable to businesses affecting interstate commerce.”75 Congress stated that one of the
statute’s objectives was to “develop[] innovative methods, techniques, and approaches for dealing with occupational safety and health problems”76; another was
to “achiev[e] safe and healthful working conditions.”77 To that end, the Act author-

Id.
Id. at *4.
74 Nat’l Fed. Of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin, 142 S.
Ct. 661 (2022).
75 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3).
76 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(5).
77 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(2), (b)(1).
72
73
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izes the Secretary of Labor to “promulgate[]” “occupational safety or health standard[s],”78 meaning a standard that is “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment.”79
While occupational safety or health standards generally must go through the ordinary regulatory process, including notice and comment, the OSH Act also authorized the agency to issue “an emergency temporary standard to take immediate
effect” if the Secretary “determines (A) that employees are exposed to grave danger
from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful
or from new hazards, and (B) that such emergency standard is necessary to protect
employees from such danger.”80 In response to the coronavirus pandemic, OSHA
issued an emergency temporary standard requiring employers with at least 100 employees to require that employees working indoors at a workplace with at least 100
employees either (1) be vaccinated against COVID-19 or (2) take a weekly COVID19 test and wear a mask at work.81
The per curiam majority opinion in NFIB v. DOL concluded that OSHA’s rule
was not authorized under the statute’s general grant of regulatory authority.82 For
the first time in the doctrine’s history, the Court framed its entire analysis of the
statute around the major questions doctrine. In the opening paragraph of the section beginning that analysis, the Court declared that OSHA’s rule was “no ‘everyday
exercise of federal power,’” but rather “a significant encroachment into the lives—
and health—of a vast number of employees.”83 And, picking up on language from
the CDC case, the Court described the consequence of that determination: “We
expect Congress to speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of
vast economic and political significance.”84 The Court declared that there was “little
doubt” that OSHA’s rule “qualifies as an exercise of such authority.”85
Unlike the eviction moratorium case, where the Court introduced the major
questions analysis as an alternative basis after seeming to conclude that the statute
unambiguously foreclosed the agency’s interpretation, the Court made clear from
the outset that it was applying a particular approach to interpreting the OSH Act
because the Court had concluded that OSHA’s rule was of “political significance”
and therefore a major question. That conclusion drove the standard the Court applied to interpreting the statute: Because the rule was major, the Court explained,
“[t]he question … is whether the Act plainly authorizes the Secretary’s mandate.”86
29 U.S.C. § 655(a).
29 U.S.C. § 652(8).
80 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1).
81 86 Fed. Reg. 61551-61553.
82 The majority did not limit its conclusion to the agency’s statutory authority to promulgate emergency temporary standards. NFIB, 2022 WL 120952, at *4 n.1.
83 NFIB, 142 S. Ct. at 665 (quoting In re MCP No. 165, 20 F.4th at 272 (Sutton, C.J.,
dissenting)).
84 Id. (quoting Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 141 S.
Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (per curiam)).
85 Id.
86 Id.
78
79
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The Court’s subsequent statutory analysis was mostly contained in a single paragraph that consisted of three short sentences of analysis, much of which relied on
italicization and emphasis. The Court substantiated its conclusion that the OSH
Act empowered the Secretary “to set workplace safety standards, not broad public
health measures,”87 by citing two provisions in the Act, one of which referred to
“occupational safety and health standards,” and the other to “employees.”88 (The
Court italicized the word “occupational” in “occupational safety and health standards” to make the point.89) The Court confirmed this conclusion by gesturing toward provisions in the Act that “speak to hazards that employees face at work.”90
(One provision refers to “working conditions,”91 another to “work situations,”92
and another to “workplace or environment where work is performed.”93)
The problem, however, is that no one, including the majority, could reasonably
contest that COVID-19 exists in the workplace, or that COVID-19 can pose a
danger in the workplace.94 The outcome of the case therefore hinged on the Court’s
further conclusion that OSHA could address only those dangers that are unique to
or particular to the workplace, relative to other places that a person might go. The
majority stated that OSHA could not regulate COVID-19 in the workplace generally because COVID-19 was not a danger unique to the workplace as such: The
majority explained that “COVID-19 can and does spread at home, in schools, during sporting events, and everywhere else that people gather”; it was accordingly a
“hazard[] of daily life” and “day-to-day danger.”95
So the majority’s observations that the statute requires OSHA to address dangers
in the “workplace” or “occupational” dangers did not, standing alone, justify the
majority’s interpretation of the statute, even on the Court’s own terms. Instead, the
majority concluded that OSHA could regulate only those dangers that are unique
to the workplace, or where a risk arises from something particular to the workplace.
But those modifiers—unique, only, primarily, particularly—are not contained in the
statute. And that appears to be where the major questions doctrine did some work
for the majority. In particular, the major questions doctrine allowed the Court to
move from the claim that the OSH Act allows OSHA to regulate dangers in the
workplace to a related but distinct conclusion that the OSH Act allows OSHA to
regulate only those dangers that are unique to the workplace, or somehow uniquely
tied to the workplace—even in the absence of statutory language pointing in that
87
88

(c)).

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. 655(b), 655(c)(1)). See also id. (citing 652(8), 654(a)(2), 655(b)-

Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. 655(b)).
Id.
91 29 U.S.C. 653(b)(1)
92 29 U.S.C. 651(a).
93 29 U.S.C. 657(a)(1).
94 NFIB, 2022 WL 120952, at *3.
95 NFIB, 2022 WL 120952, at *3; see also id. at *4 (suggesting OSHA could regulate
“where the virus poses a special danger because of the particular features of an employee’s
job or workplace” where “the danger present in such workplaces differs in both degree
and kind from the everyday risk of contracting COVID-19 that all face”).
89
90
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direction. Although Congress had not explicitly limited OSHA’s authority in that
respect, Congress also had not specifically granted OSHA authority to regulate hazards that appear in the workplace but also in other contexts like it, including
through measures such as vaccine mandates. And because under the new major
questions doctrine the onus is on Congress to explicitly grant authority in its particulars, the doctrine thus operated to terminate the agency’s authority.
The rest of the per curiam opinion’s analysis of the statutory question focused
even less on the language in the statute and more on the value-laden interpretive
tools that the Court had deployed in the CDC case in order to justify the application
of the major questions doctrine. For example, similar to the CDC case, the OSHA
opinion noted that OSHA “has never before adopted a broad public health regulation of this kind,” 96 never mind that there had not been a pandemic of this kind
during OSHA’s existence. In doing so, the Court invoked cases suggesting that the
novelty of a federal statute is a sign that the statute is unconstitutional, declaring
that the “lack of historical precedent” is a “telling indication” that OSHA’s rule
“extends beyond the agency’s legitimate reach.”97
The majority’s interpretive analysis is also notable for what it does not contain.
It has no discussion of the ordinary meaning of the OSH Act provisions under
which the agency had acted. Nor are there any dictionary definitions of the statutory
terms or phrases the Court focused on.
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito, wrote a separate
concurrence that focused even less on ordinary textualist tools of statutory interpretation to determine whether the OSHA rule was authorized by statute.98 First,
Justice Gorsuch pointed to Congress’s more recent inaction, and specifically Congress’s failure to enact a vaccination (or testing and masking) requirement while
Congress was passing legislation related to COVID-19. He described that as evidence that Congress, in the OSH Act, did not authorize OSHA to enact a vaccination (or testing and masking) requirement.99 But the conclusion does not follow
from the premise—Congress’s inaction on a vaccine requirement might instead
suggest that Congress thought that matter was for the agency to decide. More
broadly, subsequent legislative inaction is a deeply atextualist method of statutory
interpretation.100 There are many reasons why Congresses might not act other than
failure to support a vaccination requirement. And even if Congress’s inaction did
demonstrate that subsequent a subsequent Congress did not support a vaccination
requirement, that would not provide particularly good evidence about what an earlier Congress had enacted and authorized the agency to do in the OSH Act. Relatedly, Justice Gorsuch relied on a subsequent resolution of one house of Congress
NFIB, 2022 WL 120952, at *4.
97 NFIB, 2022 WL 120952, at *4 (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)).
98 Cf. Anita Krishnakumar, Some Bright Thoughts on Gorsuch’s Opinion in NFIB v. OSHA,
Election Law Blog (Jan. 15, 2022), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=126944 (describing
“how stunningly Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion (and for that matter, the per curiam
opinion) was”).
99 NFIB, 2022 WL 120952, at *6 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
100 See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory History, 108 VA. L. REV. 263, 271 (2022).
96
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(the Senate), which had disapproved of OSHA’s rule. That too is a form of subsequent legislative history, and it was also adopted by only one chamber of Congress
and not signed into law by the President.101
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence also wielded the major questions doctrine in a
similar way to how the per curiam opinion relied on the doctrine. It too framed its
analysis of the statute around the rule that Congress must “‘speak clearly’ if it wishes
to assign to an executive agency decisions ‘of vast economic and political significance.’”102 In addition to the preceding analysis, Justice Gorsuch noted that the
OSH Act “was not adopted in response to the pandemic,” and that “OSHA arguably is not even the agency most associated with public regulation.”103 And Justice
Gorsuch, like the majority, relied on OSHA’s regulatory history, arguing that
OSHA had previously adopted “only comparatively modest rules addressing dangers uniquely prevalent inside the workplace, like asbestos and rare chemicals,”104
which suggested it lacked the power to enact more far-reaching rules.
3. Climate Cases
The major questions doctrine emerged in even more realized form in West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency.105 The procedural posture and precise challenge at issue in the case are complicated: the Supreme Court was reviewing a D.C.
Circuit decision that had vacated two Trump administration rules, one rescinding
the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan, and the second imposing equipment upgrades and operating practices on coal-firing plants.106 Those rules were
promulgated based on the EPA’s interpretation of its authority under the Clean Air
Act.107
The Clean Air Act’s complicated regulatory scheme authorizes the EPA to establish performance standards for new stationary sources in Section 111. For
sources that “cause[], or contribute[] significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public welfare,” the agency must promulgate
“federal standards of performance for new sources.”108 A standard of performance
“reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the
best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving
such reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy

John Manning has argued that textualist should generally limit the interpretation of
statutes to language that made it through the bicameralism and presentment requirements.
See John F. Manning, Textualism As a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 70231 (1997).
102 NFIB, 2022 WL 120952, at *6 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Alabama Assn. of
Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (per curiam)).
103 NFIB, 2022 WL 120952, at *6 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
104 NFIB, 2022 WL 120952, at *6 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
105 2022 WL 2347278 (June 30, 2022).
106 Id. at *9.
107 Id.
108 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A), 7411(b)(1)(B).
101
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requirements) the [EPA] Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.”109 After the EPA establishes new source standards, it must then address
existing sources if they are not regulated under the CAA’s other programs.110
In October 2015, the EPA announced the Clean Power Plan, which consisted
of rules for new power plants as well as existing ones. For the existing power plants,
the Clean Power Plan included three kinds of requirements—one required practices
that would burn coal more efficiently; the other two were “generating shifting”
requirements that required some transition to methods of electricity production
that emit less carbon dioxide.111 The Supreme Court stayed the Clean Power Plan
before it went into effect and before a court of appeals decided the lawfulness of
the rule;112 the court of appeals later dismissed the pending case against the Clean
Power Plan when the Trump administration announced that it was engaged in a
new rulemaking to replace it.113 The two Trump administration rules, one rescinding the Clean Power Plan and the other replacing it, were justified in part on the
agency’s view that the Clean Air Act did not authorize it to adopt generation shifting requirements that would require energy producers to use or adopt other methods of energy production to comply with the rules. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit vacated the rules on the ground that the agency’s legal premise that
it lacked the authority to adopt generation shifting requirements was incorrect.114
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review that judgment. After rejecting arguments that the challenges to the Clean Power Plan, which had never gone into
effect, were nonjusticiable, the Court addressed the arguments about the agency’s
statutory authority.
Once again, as in the OSHA case, the Court began its analysis of the agency’s
authority under the statutes by framing the entire case around the major questions
doctrine. The Court explained that while “[i]n the ordinary case,” the “nature of
the question presented” “has no great effect on the appropriate analysis,” in “extraordinary cases,” the Court uses “a different approach.”115 In those extraordinary
cases, the Court explained “the ‘history and the breadth of the authority that [the
agency] has asserted,’ and the ‘economic and political significance’ of that assertion,
provide a ‘reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress’ meant to confer such
authority.”116
The Court acknowledged that, in prior major questions cases, the “regulatory
assertions had a colorable textual basis.”117 But, the Court declared, it “presume[s]

Id. § 7411(b)(1)(A).
110 Id. § 7411(d)(1); 80 Fed. Reg. 64711.
111 80 Fed. Reg. 64512, 64662, 64727-64728, 64731-32.
112 West Virginia v. EPA. 577 U.S. 1126 (2016).
113 West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at *9.
114 American Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
115 West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at *11.
116 West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at *11.
117 Id. at *12.
109
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that ‘Congress intends to make major policy decisions itself, not leave those decisions to agencies.’”118 And so, “in certain extraordinary cases,” “something more
than a merely plausible textual basis for the agency action is necessary. The agency
instead must point to ‘clear congressional authorization’ for the power it claims.”119
The majority then proceeded to explain why “this is a major questions case.”120
The Court declared that the provision authorizing the agency to regulate existing
power plants not already regulated under other EPA programs was an “ancillary
provision.”121 The Court explained that the agency’s assertion of authority “allowed
it to adopt a regulatory program that Congress had conspicuously and repeatedly
declined to enact itself.”122 The Court also, once again, relied on the seeming novelty of the agency’s assertion of authority, claiming that prior to 2015, the EPA had
only regulated sources by reducing the sources’ pollution, rather than requiring
sources to transition to other methods of energy production.123 After characterizing
the EPA’s regulatory approach as “unprecedented,” the Court highlighted possible
implications of the EPA’s regulatory approach: It explained that if the EPA could
require generation shifting, “it could go further, perhaps forcing coal plants to ‘shift’
away virtually all of their generation.”124 And the Court characterized it as “surprising” that Congress would have assigned to the EPA the task of “balancing the many
vital considerations of national policy implicated in deciding how Americans will
get their energy.”125
After ticking off all of these reasons for why the agency’s rule was major, the
Court declared that “precedent counsels skepticism toward EPA’s claim” that the
statutory provision authorizes it to adopt “a generation shifting approach.”126 Rather, “the Government must—under the major questions doctrine—point to “clear
congressional authorization” to regulate in that manner.127
Having framed the inquiry this away, the Court concluded the statute did not
provide such clear authorization. The Court characterized the word “system” as
“an empty vessel” and a “vague statutory grant … not close to the sort of clear
authorization required.”128 And that was that.

Id. at *12 (quoting United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 419 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
119 Id. at *13.
120 Id. at *13.
121 Id.
122 Id.; id. at *16 (“Congress, however, has consistently rejected proposals to amend the
Clean Air Act to create such a program.”).
123 Id. at *13-14.
124 Id. at *15.
125 Id. at *16, *15.
126 Id. at *17.
127 Id.
128 Id.
118
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Justice Gorsuch concurred, joined by Justice Alito. He characterized the major
questions doctrine as a “clear-statement rule[]” that “operates to protect foundational constitutional guarantees,”129 and specifically the “separation of powers.”130
The major questions doctrine, he wrote, makes sure that Congress resolves major
issues through legislation.131 He explained that “[b]y effectively requiring a broad
consensus to pass legislation, the Constitution sought to ensure that any new laws
would enjoy wide social acceptance, profit from input by an array of different perspectives during their consideration, and thanks to all this prove stable over
time.”132 Agency rules, by contrast, “[r]ather than embody a wide social consensus
and input from minority voices,” “would more often bear the support only of the
party currently in power.”133
Justice Gorsuch also elaborated on what constitutes a major policy. He started
by indicating that the doctrine applies “when an agency claims the power to resolve
a matter of great ‘political significance’ or end an ‘earnest and profound debate
across the country.’”134 Writing of the OSHA case in particular, Justice Gorsuch
elaborated that the “agency sought to mandate COVID–19 vaccines nationwide
for most workers at a time when Congress and state legislatures were engaged in
robust debates over vaccine mandates.”135 And “when Congress has ‘considered
and rejected’ bills authorizing something akin to the agency’s proposed course of
action[,] [t]hat too may be a sign that an agency is attempting to ‘work [a]round’
the legislative process to resolve for itself a question of great political significance.”136
Applying these principles to the EPA’s claim of authority to adopt generationshifting requirements, Justice Gorsuch explained, made for “a relatively easy case”
because “[w]hether these plants should be allowed to operate is a question on which
people today may disagree.”137 “Congress has debated the matter frequently” and
had declined “to adopt legislation similar to the Clean Power Plan.”138
B. The New Major Questions Doctrine
This section draws out some similarities and differences between the three recent
major questions cases and previous cases in which the Court has invoked the doctrine. While the next Part interrogates and evaluates the new major questions docId. at *18 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
130 Id. at *19, *21 (“Much as constitutional rules about retroactive legislation and sovereign immunity have their corollary clear-statement rules, Article I’s Vesting Clause has
its own: the major questions doctrine.”).
131 Id.
132 Id. at *20.
133 Id.
134 Id. at *22.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at *23.
138 Id.
129
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trine, this Part seeks to better understand how it works as a mode of statutory interpretation—in part by comparing the doctrine to the previous tools the Court has
used, or might use, to constrain agencies’ interpretive authority.
As Justice Gorsuch has stated, the core features of the new major questions doctrine resemble a clear statement rule rather than a method of resolving statutory
ambiguity in the traditional sense. Previous major questions cases used the perceived majorness of the issue the agency was resolving in one of three ways. One
was as one tool of statutory interpretation to confirm an interpretation of a statute
that the Court had already arrived at using other tools of statutory interpretation.
Thus, in Brown & Williamson, the Court worked through its interpretation of the
provision of federal law before also observing that the significance and novelty of
the agency’s assertion of authority also supported its interpretation.139 In UARG,
the Court used the majorness of the agency’s regulation as an indicia of unreasonableness—something the Chevron framework turns to only if there is statutory ambiguity.140 And in King v. Burwell, the Court concluded that it was for it to decide the
statutory question, found the statute ambiguous, and ultimately affirmed the
agency’s interpretation.141
In the new major questions cases, by contrast, the majorness of an issue
frames—and alters—the entire enterprise of statutory interpretation. Rather than
being one factor to consider within the Chevron framework or a reason to consider
the case without using Chevron but also without putting a thumb on the scale either
way, the new major questions doctrine flips the entire analysis. The structure of the
opinions partially conveys this shift: Whereas NFIB and West Virginia began their
sections on statutory interpretation with an introduction to the major questions
doctrine and the standard it established for proving the agency had authority, Brown
& Williamson concluded its analysis of the statute with an observation about the
majorness of the agency’s rule. In West Virginia in particular, the Court organized
its entire analysis around the interpretive rule it had announced.142 Indeed, as Justice
Kagan noted in dissent in the West Virginia case, it was “not until page 28 of a 31page opinion that [the Court] beg[an] to seriously discuss the meaning” of the statutory provision the agency had relied on.143
These structural differences in the opinion confirm what the rest of the opinions
make plain: In the new major questions cases, the major question doctrine alters
the degree of certainty and clarity that is required to uphold an agency’s exercise of
statutory authority. Thus, rather than resolving an ambiguity or even placing a
thumb on the scale as the Court attempts to discern the meaning of a statute, the
new major questions doctrine functions as a kind of carve out to an agency’s authority. Congress must clearly and explicitly authorize the particular agency action
at issue. If Congress has not done so, that is the end of the matter. Understood in
that way, the new major questions doctrine fundamentally reshapes the interpretive
enterprise. West Virginia reflects this new function of the major questions doctrine:
See 529 U.S. at 160.
See 573 U.S. at 321.
141 See 576 U.S. at 485-86.
142 See West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278.
143 West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at *32 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
139
140
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The opinion formulated the major questions doctrine as a clear statement rule that
required “clear congressional authorization” for the agency’s regulation.144 The majorness of a rule is not one tool among interpretive equals; it is something that alters
the very question the Court is asking in statutory interpretation cases. And that is
how lower courts have understood the Court’s new major questions cases.145
The question remains, however: how clear, exactly, must Congress be? The
Court has remained somewhat cagey about the answer to this question. There are
two possibilities. First, the Court might simply be saying that an ambiguous statute
will not be construed to authorize a “major” policy but that an unambiguous statute
(in the normal sense) would suffice. This framing is still dramatic, as it would deny
the agency authority even where the statute is ambiguous but the “best” interpretation still supports the agency. Second, the Court might be saying that, when it
comes to major questions, even a broadly worded, otherwise unambiguous statute is
not enough. We believe that this second formulation is more faithful to the cases,
and to West Virginia in particular. That belief is partly rooted in the paucity of the
Court’s “ordinary” statutory analysis after finding a question to be major. Resolving
whether a statute is ambiguous or unambiguous can be an extensive enterprise,
requiring consultation of the full range of interpretive tools. But especially in West
Virginia, the Court gives no indication that such a wide-ranging analysis is required
under the major questions doctrine. The Court did not consult any dictionaries or
linguistic canons to assess the statute’s meaning. Rather, the Court seems to give a
“quick look” at the statute to ascertain whether the particular agency action at issue
has been explicitly authorized. That is requiring something more than that the statute be unambiguous in the normal sense. It is requiring that the authorization jump
off the page. Indeed, the Court even acknowledged that the EPA’s generationshifting requirements “can be described as a ‘system,’” which is what the statute
authorized the agency to establish.146 What the statute lacked was a clear reference
to generation shifting itself.
Nor would such strength be unheard of for a doctrine referred to as a clear statement rule. Indeed, examining other clear statement rules helps to shed light on how
the new major questions doctrine differs from previous applications of it. Under
an analogous “federalism” clear-statement rule, Congress must clearly specify
whether a law applies to state governments.147 Although (again) the Court has been
cagey about just how clear Congress must be to satisfy the federalism clear-statement rule, Professors Eskridge and Frickey have identified the canon as a “super-

See id. at *17.
Brnovich v. Biden, No. CV-21-01-01568-PHX, 2022 WL 252396 (D. Ariz. Jan. 27,
2022) (invoking clear statement version of major questions doctrine to invalidate federal
contractor vaccine requirement); Feds for Medical Freedom v. Biden, No. 21-cv-356, 2022 WL
188329 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2022) (same to invalidate federal employee vaccine requirement),
rev’d on other grounds by No. 22-40043, 2022 WL 1043909 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 2022); Louisiana v. Biden, No. 21-CV-01074, 2022 WL 438313 (W.D. La. Feb. 11, 2022) (same for executive order requiring calculation of carbon costs)
146 Id.
147 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
144
145
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strong clear statement rule” that can be rebutted “only through unambiguous statutory text targeted at the specific problem.”148 Thus, if a federal statute requires employers
to pay a minimum wage, but the statute does not clearly specify that “employers”
include state and local government employers, the minimum wage requirement
would not apply to state and local governments, even though “employer” would in
ordinary language unambiguously include both public and private employers. That
clear statement rule thus changes the entire enterprise of statutory interpretation:
the question is not what the best interpretation of the statute is or even whether it
is unambiguous in the normal sense. The question is instead whether the statute
speaks with particular clarity. That is why Justice Kagan, in dissent, described the
“major questions doctrine” as a “get-out-of-text-free card[].”149
This version of the major questions doctrine differs from how the Court has
previously used statutory interpretation to constrain agencies’ authority, including
in the prior major questions cases. When the Court decides whether an agency’s
interpretation is correct, rather than expressly analyzing the issue under the Chevron
framework, the Court is engaged an exercise of statutory interpretation and a search
for the ordinary meaning of the statutory provision in question. Alternatively, the
major questions doctrine might factor into Chevron by functioning as one mark
against an agency’s interpretation of a statute, similar to Brown & Williamson or
UARG.150 Or the majorness of the question might mean that courts, rather than
agencies, should decide what the statute means. But in all of these examples, the
Court is still trying to interpret what Congress said and what it meant to say.151
That is not true of the new major questions clear statement rule. Strong clear
statement rules can generate errors about what Congress said and what it meant.
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules As Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 611 (1992).
149 Id. at *38 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
150 See, e.g., Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1014, 1016, 1020-21 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (invoking major questions doctrine after deploying other tools of statutory interpretation);
NRDC v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 199 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying doctrine to support conclusion based on plain language); Merck & Co. v. HHS, 962 F.3d 531, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(applying doctrine as fourth and final indicator of unreasonableness under Chevron Step
Two); New Mexico v. Dep’t of Interior, 854 F.3d 1207, 1224-27 (10th Cir. 2017) (applying
doctrine only after determining that “the text of the IGRA is explicit”).
151 This is how lower courts understood the major questions doctrine before the three
most recent cases discussed in the article—as requiring a court to determine whether a
provision is ambiguous, and also as requiring a court to apply ordinary rules of statutory
interpretation to discern the meaning of an ambiguous provision governing a major question. See, e.g., ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 801 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(concluding provision was not ambiguous, invoking King v. Burwell); Cuthill v. Blinken, 990
F.3d 272 (2d Cir. 2021) (same); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2016), aff’d by
equally divided Court, 579 U.S. 547 (same); Vullo v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, 378 F. SUpp.
3d 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (same), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Lacewell v. Off. Of Comptroller of Currency, 999 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2021); Chamber of Commerce v. Dep’t of Labor, 885
F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018) (same and alternatively holding the interpretation unreasonable);
In re Gateway Radiology Consultants, P.A., 983 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2020) (invoking King for
the proposition that courts rather than agencies would resolve statutory ambiguity).
148
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Take the Gregory clear statement rule: Before the Court announced the clear statement rule in that case, a Congress that required all employers to pay a minimum
wage used a word that would normally include state and local employees, and that’s
probably what Congress meant to do. But under the clear statement rule, the fact
that interpreting the words that Congress used leads to one answer is not enough.152
A clear statement rule requires something else.
For this reason, the new major questions doctrine is less rooted in text and is less
formalist than its prior incarnations. A considerable amount of scholarship has
identified the less formalist features of the major questions doctrine as applied prior
to 2021.153 Although the “old” major questions doctrine was more closely tied to
normal statutory interpretation in the ways described above, it was always partly
inspired by underlying substantive (and arguably constitutional) values that are
unique to a particular context—statutes empowering administrative agencies—as
opposed to trans-substantive tools that assist in identifying the semantic meaning
of statutory language.154 As such, it required courts to draw on values that cannot
be straightforwardly derived from any given piece of text. And indeed, in any of its
various iterations, the major questions doctrine asks courts to consider, alongside
the ordinary meaning, context, and structure of a statute, the consequences of an
interpretation and whether those consequences cohere with certain precepts of our
system of separated powers.155
But the most recent iteration of the major questions doctrine has only expanded
the anti-formalist elements of the doctrine.156 The major questions doctrine is now
more fully realized as a “substantive” canon of interpretation—“principles and presumptions that judges have created to protect important background norms from
the Constitution, common-law practices, or policies related to particular subject
152 See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman & Julian Davis Mortenson, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 505-06 (Foundation Press 2021)/
153 E.g., Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN.
L. REV. 19, 20-23 (2010); Beau J. Baumann, Americana Administrative Law, 111 GEO. L. J.
__ (2023), at 1-4; Natasha Brunstein & Richard L. Revesz, Mangling the Major Questions Doctrine, 74 ADMIN. L. REV. 318 (2022); Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On The Democratic Legitimacy of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2019,
2034-39 (2018).
154 Anita Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 827
(2017).
155 See Beau J. Baumann, Americana Administrative Law, 111 GEO. L. J. __ (forthcoming
2023), at 4 (“[T]he major questions doctrine is not really meant to capture some descriptive
claim on how Congress ‘speaks’ through statutory text.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000); Loshin & Nielsen, supra note 154, at 63 (“The
notion that Congress ‘does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in
vague terms or ancillary provisions’ is premised more in normative aspiration than legislative reality and is startlingly out of sync with the Court’s modern approach to statutory
language.”); Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On the Democratic Legitimacy of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2019, 2043-45 (2018).
156 See Cass R. Sunstein, There Are Two ‘Major Questions’ Doctrines, 73 ADMIN. L. REV.
475, 477-78 (2021) (noting that there could be two ways of understanding the major questions doctrine).
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areas”—not keyed to the meaning of the statute bur rather to broader values,157
Substantive canons differ from semantic canons that focus on the text or rules of
grammar to interpret language no matter the subject area or design of the statute.158
Another indication that the major questions doctrine has moved even farther
away from a focus on the meaning of enacted text is the time horizon over which
the courts now assess whether an issue is major. Typically, textualism focuses on
the meaning that the words of a statute would have had at the time the statute was
enacted.159 Were the major questions doctrine a textualist tool, one would think that
courts would assess whether the Congress that enacted the statute would have understood the policy in question to be a major one (and thus requiring special authorization) at the time of the statute’s passage.160
Yet that is not how recent courts have applied the major questions doctrine.
Courts instead mostly seem to care whether members of the public today would
view the agency’s policy as a major one. In that form, the major question doctrine
shares some similarities with subsequent legislative history: it asks what subsequent
legislatures or the broader, intertemporal public think about the agency’s approach.
This marks a subtle shift from prior forms of the doctrine. Compare, for example,
King v. Burwell, which concluded that Congress had not assigned to the Internal
Revenue Service the authority to decide whether to offer tax credits for federally
created exchanges.161 King focused on the significance of the issue in the context of
the statutory scheme of which it was a part—i.e., evidence that was contemporaneous to the statute’s enactment.162 King, of course, was decided not too long after the
passage of the relevant statute. But that was not true of Utility Air Regulatory Group
v. EPA, which similarly determined that the agency’s assertion of authority in that
case would “render the statute ‘unrecognizable to the Congress that designed’ it.”163 In
both cases, therefore, the Court purported to render its “majorness” determination
by reference to the public (or the Congress) that existed at the time the statute was
passed.
The approach in those cases differs from that seen in Alabama Association of Realtors, which interpreted the CDC’s authority under the 1944 Public Health Service
157

(2017).

Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 833

Id. at 833-34.
E.g., Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) (“We must determine
the ordinary public meaning of Title VII’s command …. To do so, we orient ourselves to
the time of the statute’s adoption.”).
160 Even in its origins, Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000), considered some post-enactment history. See id. at 150-60. But the
major questions analysis appeared to turn more on the political history of cigarettes and
their “portion of the American economy” dating back to the statute’s enactment. Id. at
159-60. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), similarly relied on the political history of
physician-assisted suicide that predated and was contemporaneous to the Controlled Substances Act. See id. at 267-68.
161 576 U.S. 473 (2015)
162 See id. at 485-86.
163 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014).
158
159
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Act.164 In that case, the Court focused on how and why the agency’s asserted authority was major from the perspective of the present day. The monetary costs of
the order and the number of people potentially shielded from eviction by the order
were of course expressed in present-day terms.165 But the Court’s parade of horribles was also devoid of any historical grounding. For example, the Court expressed
disbelief that the statutory authorization would allow the agency to mandate “free
grocery delivery” or “free computers.”166 Perhaps those applications—or whatever
their historical analogues might be—would prove startling to 1914 Americans. But
the Court gives no reason, apart from its members’ own presently grounded intuitions, for concluding that they would be.
The other recent agency case involving COVID, National Federation of Independent
Business v. Department of Labor, reasoned similarly. There, the Court interpreted the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s authority under the 1970 OSH
Act.167 There too, the Court relied on the present-day numbers of persons subject
to OSHA’s rule. But more strikingly, the Court simply asserted that a vaccine mandate is “a significant encroachment into the lives—and health—of a vast number
of employees.”168 That judgment barely hides the fact that it is grounded in the
public debates of the present. To be clear, we have no idea whether, in 1970, a
vaccine mandate (let alone a vaccine-or-testing mandate, as OSHA’s rule was)
would have been viewed to be as severe of an encroachment on liberty as some
view it to be today. But the Court gave no indication that it cared to know.
One might seek to shore up the formalist bona fides of the new major questions
doctrine by describing it as a method of enforcing a revived nondelegation doctrine.169 But despite some Justices’ efforts at equating the major-question-doctrineas-clear-statement rule with the values underlying the nondelegation doctrine,170 the
clear statement rule, at least as it has been articulated thus far, operates differently
than the nondelegation doctrine (either the current version or a revived one). Under
current precedents, Congress may constitutionally delegate authority to agencies if
it supplies them with an “intelligible principle” to guide their discretion, and most
any criteria, even broad, vague ones, suffice as intelligible principles.171 Some Justices would revive the nondelegation doctrine to place greater constraints on Congress that would require Congress to “make[] the policy decisions when regulating
141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021).
141 S. Ct. at 2489.
166 Id.
167 142 S. Ct. 661 (2022).
168 See id. at 665 (“This is no ‘everyday exercise of federal power.’ It is instead a significant encroachment into the lives—and health—of a vast number of employees.” (quoting
In re MCP No. 165, 20 F.4th at 272 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting)).
169 See Gocke, supra note 2 (describing the major questions doctrine in these terms, but
not defending it). One response might be that the nondelegation doctrine itself is not wellgrounded in constitutional text and history, but we can put that to the side for now.
170 E.g., West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at *21-22 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); NFIB,
142 S. Ct. at 667 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
171 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 53, at 282-83; Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457, 473-76 (2001).
164
165
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private conduct,” and only allow Congress to rely on “another branch to ‘fill up the
details.’”172
In the major questions cases to date, the doctrine requires Congress only to
clearly specify a particular mode or method of regulation.173 Congress may still be
able to provide vague terms for when an agency may adopt that mode or method
of regulation. For example, in the vaccine cases, Congress might have said that “the
agency can impose a vaccine requirement for all workers when it concludes it would
be necessary to avoid grave danger.” That provision would seem to satisfy the
Court’s new major questions cases with respect to whether OSHA could adopt a
vaccination requirement for everyone in the workplace, satisfying the major questions rule. But that provision would still allow an agency to impose obligations on
third parties based on an agency’s determination, rather than Congress’s, and so it
wouldn’t satisfy proponents of a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine.174
Nor does the major questions doctrine really enforce a revived nondelegation
doctrine by avoiding a constitutional issue. Under the constitutional avoidance
canon, which also can operate as a super-strong clear-statement rule, the courts are
instructed to avoid interpretations of statutes that would raise a constitutional issue.175 Applied in the agency context, one way to think about constitutional avoidance is as follows: If the statute had clearly and explicitly said what the agency is
interpreting the statute to mean, would that require the court to resolve a constitutional question? If yes, constitutional avoidance applies and provides a reason to
reject the agency’s interpretation. The major questions doctrine, however, doesn’t
avoid any nondelegation issues that would not also be posed by the statute considered without reference to the agency interpretation under review. Let’s return to
the vaccine mandate example. Assume for sake of argument that there’s no dispute
that the statute granting OSHA power to promulgate emergency standards if it
makes certain findings violates the nondelegation doctrine. (It actually does not
matter if you agree or not.) OSHA interprets the statute to provide it with the authority to mandate vaccines. Then ask the question above: Had Congress explicitly
granted such authority—say by including “and this power extends to mandating
vaccines” in the statute—would that raise a nondelegation problem? Not any more
so than the underlying statute under current doctrine, and not any less than the
underlying statute under a revived nondelegation doctrine.
Thus, the major questions doctrine, again at least as articulated thus far, does not
itself prohibit agencies from exercising delegated authority under open-ended
guidelines. It just requires Congress to specifically list potentially major things an
agency might do pursuant to those open-ended guidelines. As the next Part dis-

Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
See supra Part II.A.
174 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (urging the Court to overrule the
intelligible principle standard, which allow agencies to impose requirements on third parties
based on broadly defined criteria).
175 See Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme
Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2115-18 (2015) (explaining constitutional
avoidance doctrine).
172
173
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cusses, that is still a significant practical limit on agencies’ authority: The clear-statement rule increases the obstacles to delegation (in particular, it makes them more
difficult to carry out and therefore less likely to be used effectively). But the new
major questions doctrine does not avoid constitutional issues with broad or openended delegations to agencies. As the closing section of West Virginia said: “A decision of such magnitude and consequence rests with Congress itself, or an agency
acting pursuant to a clear delegation from that representative body.”176
* * *
With these developments laid out, it is interesting to note that the major questions doctrine has come to share important parallels with the absurdity doctrine.177
Under the absurdity doctrine, if an interpretation of a statute would “lead[] to an
absurd result,” the statute “must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity.”178 John
Manning has argued forcefully that the Court’s version of the absurdity doctrine
rests on an explicit form of purposivism—specifically, under the absurdity doctrine,
the absurdity of an interpretation (a value judgment made by judges) provides evidence that the interpretation is contrary to Congress’s intentions.179 Manning has
also argued that there are strong formalist objections to the absurdity doctrine, and
that statutory interpretation formalists should want to use the doctrine rarely, and
only upon very clear showings of absurdity.180
Today, the major questions doctrine also seems to rest on a similar kind of purposivism—specifically, the perceived majorness or significance of an agency’s use
of the statute supplies evidence that the agency’s use of the statute is contrary to
Congress’s intentions.181 As a descriptive claim about what Congress’s intentions
are, that statement is contestable, at least in some of the applications in which the
Court has invoked it.182 While the next section provides a more normative analysis
of the new major questions doctrine, here it is simply notable that the major questions appears to be even more vulnerable to Manning’s formalist critique of the
absurdity doctrine because it is deployed more often, and based on weaker evidence.
Most significantly, the major questions doctrine turns on a dramatically lower
threshold for establishing the relevant “absurdity” (or perceived oddity) than the
traditional absurdity doctrine does. In traditional absurdity cases, the standard

2022 WL 234728, at *18.
See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003).
178 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459-60 (1892).
179 Manning, Absurdity, supra note 177, at 2485-86.
180 Id.
181 See sources cited supra note TK (anti-formalist MQD).
182 See Abbe Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Inside Statutory Interpretation, 66 STAN. L
REV. 725, 799 (2014) (using survey to show that some version of the major questions doctrine might be consistent with congressional intentions). But see Ryan D. Doerfler, Who
Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979 (2017) (questioning whether statutory
interpretation principles must align with congressional expectations).
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courts use is that the absurdity must be “absolutely clear.”183 Moreover, the relevant
absurdity is supposed to be somewhat objective, in the sense that it should be clear
to most everyone.184 Yet the Court requires nothing approximating that degree of
certainty regarding the perceived oddity of an agency’s interpretation or application
of a statute. Rather, in the context of the major questions doctrine, the Court seems
to be willing to reject an agency’s interpretation or application of a statute based
only on its conclusion that the agency’s application is major in the eyes of the Court,
or in the eyes of some participants in the political process, not by reference to some
unmistakable true absurdity.185 In the OSHA vaccine case, the Court declared that
“[t]here can be little doubt that OSHA’s mandate qualifies” as major given the
Court’s description of the policy as “a significant encroachment into the lives—and
health—of a vast number of employees.”186 That is also how Chief Justice Roberts
articulated his understanding of the threshold for invoking the major questions
doctrine:
[J]ust thinking back on Alabama Realtors or the OSHA vaccine case,
I don’t know how you would read those as not starting with the
idea that this – however you want to phrase it, this is kind of surprising that the CDC is, you know, regulating evictions and all that
and then look to see if there’s something in there, I guess, that suggests, well, however surprised, you know, that’s – that’s still what –
we think that type of regulation was – was appropriate.187
Another way to think about the relationship between the major questions doctrine and the absurdity doctrine is the following: If the consequences of the agency’s
interpretation or application of the statute were truly absurd—and if that absurdity
were absolutely clear to most every reasonable person—then the absurdity doctrine
would have constrained the agency’s interpretation of the statute. But because that
standard was (obviously) not satisfied in the major questions cases, the major questions doctrine supplied the vehicle to constrain the agency’s authority. And the ma-

United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Manning, Absurdity, supra note 177, at 2459 n. 265; Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s
Error, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 811 (2016).
184 See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 470–71 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“[The absurdity canon] remains a legitimate tool of the Judiciary, however,
only as long as the Court acts with self-discipline by limiting the exception to situations
where the result of applying the plain language would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i.e.,
where it is quite impossible that Congress could have intended the result, and where the
alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most anyone.”).
185 See, e.g., NFIB v. DOL, 142 S. Ct. at 666 (describing OSHA’s policy as “a broad
public health regulation”); Alabama Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489 (describing CDC’s
eviction moratorium as “of ‘vast economic and political significance’” and accordingly invoking the major questions doctrine).
186 NFIB, 142 S. Ct. at 665.
187 Transcript of Oral Argument in West Virginia v. EPA, at 83-84, https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2021/20-1530_p8k0.pdf.
183
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jor questions doctrine apparently allowed the Justices to rely on the mere assessment that the agency’s interpretation or application of the statute was “surprising”
(to the Justices in the majority) and therefore required a more explicit authorization
from Congress. That is a dramatic expansion of a doctrine that rests on the kind of
purposivism that Manning identified in the absurdity doctrine and criticized on formalist grounds. It allows the Court to resort to purposivism based on a lower
threshold, and in a greater set of cases.
III.

ASSESSING THE NEW MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE

This Part offers an initial, critical assessment of the recent developments in the
major questions doctrine. It focuses on the increasing and outsized importance that
certain evidence has taken on with respect to assessing whether a rule is major—in
particular, the perceived political significance of a rule, as well as the extent to which
a rule differs from previous rules that the agency has adopted. This Part shows how
these indicia of majorness exacerbate institutional and political pathologies, undermine the ostensible premises of the major questions doctrine, and generate a doctrine that is likely to undermine delegations in the circumstances in which they are
more likely to be used and more likely to be effective.
Part III.A focuses on the pathologies created by the Court’s attention to the
political significance of an agency rule. It shows how, in politically polarized times,
this aspect of the major questions doctrine allows political parties and movements
to make an issue “major” through generating controversy, and that this effectively
generates exceptions, outside of the formal lawmaking process, to otherwise broad
statutory grants of authority to agencies. Part III.A unpacks the pathologies that
the new major questions doctrine creates, including how it exacerbates the constitutional system’s skew toward minority rule, and shows how this dynamic undermines the purported formalist bases for the major questions doctrine. 188 It also
shows how this version of the major questions doctrine results in a doctrine that is
transparently and inescapably linked to political judgments.
Part III.B focuses on the pathologies created by the Court’s attention to regulatory novelty and the implications of the agency’s theory of statutory authority. It
shows how this approach to majorness effectively nullifies an agency’s ability to
exercise delegated authority in the set of cases where Congress would have reason
to rely on delegations to agencies and where such delegations would be effective.
It also raises concerns about how this version of the major questions doctrine presents an appearance of faux minimalism, which may result in fewer checks on the
Court’s authority to reach more politically infused judgments.

See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence,
126 YALE L.J. 346 (2016) (illustrating how separation of powers doctrines vacillates between rules and standards); Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure:
A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819, 1839 (2016) (“This is the
moment, to put it provocatively, when the theory begins to cannibalize itself.”).
188
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A. Politics, Partisanship, and Minority Rule
This Part unpacks the implications of the Court’s willingness to declare an agency
policy major—and thus to require it be supported by clear congressional authorization—based on whether the rule is politically controversial. This aspect of the
new major questions doctrine effectively allows political parties to unmake and
amend laws by polarizing an issue and making it “major.” As the political process
unfolds, the Court can seize on political, ideological opposition to an agency policy
to create a statutory exception that effectively forbids the agency from pursuing the
policy. This doctrinal structure may enable and embolden a political party to use
politicking rather than the legislative process to constrain agency authority. But a
political party or movement need not consciously adopt such a strategy for that
result to occur. The application of the new major questions doctrine has that effect
anytime it is triggered by the perceived present-day controversy surrounding an
issue. And this anti-formalist mechanism of altering statutes is at odds with the
formalist understanding of the separation of powers that purportedly undergirds
the doctrine.
Further, the focus on whether an agency rule is politically controversial exacerbates several pathologies of the constitutional system. The new major questions
doctrine further injects politics and ideology into a doctrine that was already susceptible to such influence. And it further exacerbates the constitutional system’s
skew toward minority rule.
1. Political Significance and Majorness
Both the Supreme Court and the lower courts’ recent application of the major
questions doctrine suggest that a policy can be major, and accordingly require explicit congressional authorization, where an issue is politically significant. Consider
the Supreme Court’s decision staying the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s emergency temporary standard requiring employers with more than 100
employees to impose a test-and-mask rule for unvaccinated workers, or require
vaccination.189 Quoting from the Court’s prior decision invalidating the CDC’s eviction moratorium, the Court declared that “[w]e expect Congress to speak clearly
when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of vast economic and political significance.”190
A good part of the Court’s analysis traded in characterizations of vaccines that
sounded in policy objections to vaccination requirements that had been raised in
the political process. The Court also presented the statements in ways that channeled talking points that were contingent products of present-day political arguments and political contestation. For example, favorably quoting Chief Judge Sutton on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Court declared that

Nat’l Fed. Of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Labor, (Jan. 13, 2022). The rule was limited to
employees working indoors in close proximity with others. It also contained medical and
religious exemptions. 86 Fed. Reg. 61402 (2021).
190 NFIB v. OSHA, p. 6 (quoting Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs., 594 U.S. __ (2021)(per curiam) (slip op. at 6).
189

DRAFT

33

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4165724

33

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 239 [2022]

vaccines were “no ‘everyday exercise of federal power.’”191 The Court described
vaccines as “a significant encroachment into the lives—and health” of employees.192 Only when the Court went on to consider the equities in the case did the
Court note possible compliance costs with the OSHA standard.193 Previously, in
the CDC eviction moratorium case, the Court had explicitly noted that “the issues
at stake” with the moratorium “are not merely financial,” in explaining why the case
involved a major question that required explicit congressional authorization.194
The lower court opinions in cases about the OSHA rule used similar language
that sounded in a similar register in order to explain the political significance of the
OSHA rule. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decision staying the
OSHA rule described it as a “sweeping pronouncement[] on matters of public
health” that “affect[ed]” people “in the profoundest of ways.”195 The Fifth Circuit
opinion explicitly noted that the standard “purports to definitively resolve one of
today’s most hotly debated political issues” as a reason why the case involved a
major question.196 Judge Larsen’s dissenting opinion in the Sixth Circuit’s OSHA
case, which would have stayed the OSHA rule, reasoned similarly. In characterizing
the significance of what OSHA did, Judge Larsen noted that “A vaccine may not
be taken off when the workday ends; and its effects, unlike this rule, will not expire
in six months.”197
The oral arguments at the Supreme Court echoed language that sounded in the
register of policy objections to vaccine requirements or characterizations that reflected contingent present-day political arguments. Justice Alito observed that the
OSHA vaccination rule “affects employees all the time.”198 Justice Alito also
pointed to the “risks” of vaccination and the possibility that some people “will
suffer adverse consequences.” 199 Justice Gorsuch made similar points during the
oral argument in Biden v. Missouri, the challenge to the Center for Medicare and
NFIB, p. 5 (quoting In re MCP No. 165, 20 F. 4th at 272 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting)).
192 NFIB, p. 5. Again quoting favorably from Chief Judge Sutton’s opinion, the Court
observed that “[a] vaccination, after all, ‘cannot be undone at the end of the workday.’”
NFIB, p. 5 (quoting In re MCP No. 165, 20 F. 4th at 274 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting)).
193 NFIB, p. 8. The Court stated, despite the standard for granting stays, that it was
“not our role to weigh such tradeoffs,” a hasty observation consistent with the Court’s
hasty dispatching of the law on remedies in emergency applications. See Testimony of Stephen I. Vladeck, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/stephen-vladeck-929-testimony (Sept. 29, 2021).
194 Alabama Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489.
195 BST Holdings LLC v. OSHA, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33698, at *8 (5th Cir. Nov. 12,
2021).
196 BST Holdings, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33698, at *20.
197 In re MCP No. 165, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 37349, at *85 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
Chief Judge Sutton likewise characterized vaccines as “a medical procedure that cannot be
removed at the end of the shift.” MCP No. 165, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 37024, at * 8
(Sutton, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at *21-22.
198 Transcript of Oral Argument at p. 103, NFIB, 142 S. Ct. 661 (2022).
199 Transcript of Oral Argument at p. 105-06, NFIB, 142 S. Ct. 661 (2022). See also id.
at p. 107 (“There is a risk, right?”).
191
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Medicaid Services’ vaccination requirement for workers at federal healthcare facilities.200
The specific language that courts used to explain the political significance of
vaccine policies channeled policy objections to vaccine requirements that were
raised in the political process or reflected contingent products of those political
arguments. At a conference with anti-vaccine activists, for example, President
Donald Trump’s son Eric Trump attacked the COVID-19 vaccine in these terms:
“Do you want to be left alone or not?”201 President Trump himself posed a
challenge to vaccination requirements in these terms: “[We] have our freedoms.”202
Commentators asked how “effective” and “necessary” the vaccine was.203 And
people expressed some of the concern about vaccines as a desire to “be[] able to
control something.”204
The reasoning in West Virginia also seemed to point to the existence of present
policy objections to EPA generation-shifting requirements in order to explain the
political significance of the rule. The Court explained that “the fact that the same
basic scheme EPA adopted ‘has been the subject of an earnest and profound debate
across the country’” indicated that the EPA’s rule was major.205 And in his concurrence explaining when an issue was so politically significant it would be major, Justice Gorsuch noted points at which “certain States were considering” the issues
involved and times “when Congress and state legislatures were engaged in robust
debates” over them.206
This analysis differs from how previous major questions cases had analyzed
whether an issue as major. Most of the earlier cases purported to identify major
questions based on whether an agency rule was economically significant and would
result in substantial compliance costs. In the Benzene case, sometimes identified as
the ur-source of the doctrine, Justice Stevens’ plurality opinion concluded that
OSHA lacked the authority to prohibit concentrations of benzene of one part per
million parts of air, and impose medical testing requirements on workplaces that
contain 0.5 parts per million parts of air.207 The Court described the benzene standard as “an expensive way of providing some additional protection for a relatively
small number of employees,” noting that OSHA had estimated the standard would
“require capital investments … of approximately $266 million, first-year operating

Transcript of Oral Argument at p. 40, Biden v. Missouri, 142 S. Ct. 647 (2022).
Geoff Brumfield, Inside the growing alliance between anti-vaccine activists and pro-Trump
Republicans, NPR (Dec. 6, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/12/06/1057344561/antivaccine-activists-political-conference-trump-republicans.
202 Yamiche Alexander, Why 41 percent of Republicans don’t plan to get the COVID vaccine,
PBS (Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/why-41-percent-of-republicans-dont-plan-to-get-the-covid-vaccine.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at *16 (quoting Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267-68).
206 West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at *22 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
207 Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. API, 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
200
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costs … of $187 million to $205 million and recurring annual costs of approximately $34 million.”208 Similarly, in Utility Air Regulatory Group, when the Court invalidated EPA’s emission standards for greenhouses gases from certain stationary
sources for purposes of the relevant programs, the Court construed the agency’s
statutory authority in light of the economic costs from the agency action.209 The
Court described the “calamitous consequences” from the EPA’s interpretation of
the statute—“annual administrative costs would swell from $12 million to over $1.5
billion; and decade-long delays in issuing permits would become common, causing
construction projects to grind to a halt nationwide.”210 And in FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., when the Supreme Court first articulated the major question doctrine to support its conclusion that the FDA lacked the statutory authority
to regulate tobacco, the Court similarly focused on the economic and regulatory
compliance costs of interpreting the agency’s statutory authority a particular way.211
The Court characterized the issue as whether the agency had “jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a significant portion of the American economy,” including by outright prohibiting cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.212
We do not mean to champion the use of compliance costs in assessing the majorness of an agency policy. But they at least provide a somewhat more objective
measure than the more overtly values-based criteria on display in the more recent
cases. Indeed, in those cases, the federal courts’ sense that vaccines were politically
controversial, and therefore a major question, partially reflected a sustained campaign to politicize COVID-19 vaccines. Former President Trump consistently
downplayed the threat posed by the virus, likening it to the flu, branding it a hoax,
and accusing Democrats of politicizing it,213 and other Republican leaders and
commentators followed suit.214 They suggested that the immune system can fight

448 U.S. at 628-29.
573 U.S. 302 (2014).
210 573 U.S. at 321.
211 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
212 529 U.S. at 159.
213 Bolsen & Palm, supra note TK, at 83; see also Tamara Keith, Timeline: What Trump
Has Said and Done About the Coronavirus, NPR (Apr. 21, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/04/21/837348551/timeline-what-trump-has-said-and-doneabout-the-coronavirus (comparing Trump’s statements about the virus in the early months
of the pandemic to his administration’s).
214 See, e.g., Laurie Kellman, Iowa Sen. Joni Ernst Suggests COVID-19 Numbers Are Inflated
by Health Care Providers for Profit, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/coronavirus/ct-nw-joni-ernist-coronavirus-numbers-fake-20200902-xlydfywwzzckvklce3gcc54ws4-story.html (statement of Republican Senator Joni Ernst)
(“These health care providers and others are reimbursed at a higher rate if COVID is tied
to it, so what do you think they’re doing?”); Oliver Darcy, Fox Business Parts Ways with Trish
Regan, Host Who Dismissed Coronavirus as 'Impeachment Scam', CNN BUSINESS (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/27/media/trish-regan-fox-news/index.html (discussing
conservative news host Trish Regan’s statements that the “liberal media” was using
COVID-19 to “demonize and destroy” Trump to hurt his chances of reelection).
208
209
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off the virus without the vaccine,215 and that the vaccine contributes to—rather
than prevents—the contraction of, and death by, COVID-19.216 Republican
commentators have analogized vaccine mandates to behavior attributed to Nazis
during World War II,217 and conservative states have banned vaccine mandates
altogether.218 The COVID-19 vaccination rate of a given geographical location is
effectively a proxy for the party affiliation of its voters.219
2. Anti-Formalism: Political Significance and Separation of Powers
This section spells out how the Court’s attention to whether an agency rule is
politically controversial allows ideological opponents of particular policies to effectively unmake portions of a statute delegating authority to an agency. It draws out
how this doctrinal feature undermines one of the doctrine’s formalist justifica-

See Bill Glauber, Republican U.S. Sen. Ron Johnson Uses God in One of Multiple Attempts
at Sowing Doubt Over the Efficacy of the COVID-19 Vaccines, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL
(Jan. 7, 2022), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/2022/01/07/wisconsin-sen-ronjohnson-again-questions-proven-success-vaccines/9129753002/ (statement of Republican
Senator Ron Johnson) (“Why do we think that we can create something better than God
in terms of combating disease? Why do we assume that the body's natural immune system
isn't the marvel that it really is?”).
216 See, e.g., Gerrard Kaonga, Tucker Carlson Suggests Vaccinated More Likely to Get COVID,
NEWSWEEK (Jan. 6, 2022), https://www.newsweek.com/tucker-carlson-fox-news-coronavirus-vaccine-covid-19-1666199 (statement of Tucker Carlson) (“[I]t it seems like the
shot makes it more likely that you are going to get COVID . . .”); William Vaillancourt,
Charlie Kirk Suggests COVID Vaccines Are to Blame for America’s High Death Rate, THE DAILY
BEAST (Feb. 8. 2022), https://www.thedailybeast.com/charlie-kirk-goes-on-tucker-carlson-to-suggest-covid-vaccines-are-to-blame-for-high-death-rates?ref=scroll.
217 Yelena Dzhanova, Tucker Carlson Relates COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates to Nazi Experiments on Human Subjects in Concentration Camps, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 22, 2022),
https://www.businessinsider.com/tucker-carlson-compares-vaccine-mandates-to-nazimedical-experiments-2022-1; see also Hsu and Tracy, supra note TK (stating that Former
Pennsylvania State Representative Sam Rohrer compared the promotion of the COVID19 vaccine to Nazi tactics).
218 See State Efforts to Ban or Enforce COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates and Passports, NATIONAL
ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.nashp.org/statelawmakers-submit-bills-to-ban-employer-vaccine-mandates/.
219 See Geoff Brumfiel, Emily Kwong, & Rebecca Ramirez, What’s Driving the Political
(Dec.
9,
2021),
Divide
Over
Vaccinations,
NPR
https://www.npr.org/2021/12/08/1062476574/whats-driving-the-political-divide-overvaccinations (finding that counties that largely voted for Trump have had mortality rates
nearly three times that of counties that voted for Biden, which “appears to be driven by a
partisan divide in vaccination rates.”); see also Don Albrecht, Vaccination, Politics, and
PUBLIC
HEALTH
(Jan.
14,
2022),
COVID-19
Impacts,
BMC
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-021-12432-x (stating that, “[b]ecause [Republican leaders] have downplayed the virus and failed to encourage vaccination, Republican leaning
counties have failed to implement safety measures, failed to get a high proportion of residents vaccinated, and as a consequence suffered higher COVID-19 case and death rates.”).
215
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tions—namely, that the doctrine ensures issues are resolved in the legislative process, rather than outside of it. And it highlights the anti-formalist features of the
doctrine by comparing and contrasting it to de facto delegations that the Court has
invalidated, and to academic theories about the authority to effectively unmake laws
or render them without force or effect.
The “politically controversial” element of the Court’s major question doctrine is
decidedly anti-formalist despite the doctrine’s purportedly formalist justifications.
In particular, the doctrine seems to allow a motivated political party to functionally
amend a statute through political opposition rather than through the legislative process, despite the doctrine’s claimed focus on returning issues to the legislative process. In his concurrence in the OSHA case, for example, Justice Gorsuch wrote
that “[t]he major questions doctrine … ensures that the national government’s
power to make the laws that govern us remains where Article I of the Constitution
says it belongs—with the people’s elected representatives.”220
Consider, by way of contrast, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Immigration and
Naturalization Services v. Chadha221 and Clinton v. City of New York,222 both of which
invalidated actions that the Court described as amending laws outside of the ordinary legislative process.223 In Chadha, the Court struck down the so-called legislative
veto, a mechanism by which one House of Congress could overrule the INS’s immigration determination about a particular individual.224 (In brief, an immigration
judge had decided to suspend Mr. Chadha’s deportation and adjust his status to
that of a lawful permanent resident.225 The House of Representatives, acting pursuant to the statutory provision authorizing legislative vetoes, then passed a resolution opposing the suspension of Chadha’s deportation and vetoing it.226) The
Court held unconstitutional the statutory provision authorizing one House of Congress to alter the Attorney General’s immigration determination, reasoning “that
the legislative power of the Federal Government [must] be exercised in accord with
a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure”—bicameralism
and presentment.227 The legislative veto impermissibly allowed an exercise of the
legislative power—altering the rights and duties of persons outside the legislative
branch—outside of that process.228 Clinton v. City of New York reasoned similarly
NFIB, 142 S. Ct. at 668 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
222 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
223 To be sure, these conclusions are debatable, particularly in Clinton; our point is only
to highlight that it is a general proposition that laws cannot be amended except for through
the legislative process of bicameralism and presentment. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2366 (2001) (explaining the weaknesses of the
bicameralism and presentment analysis); Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125
YALE L.J. 1548, 1561-62 (2016).
224 462 U.S. 919.
225 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923-24.
226 Id. at 926-27. The resolution applied to several other individuals as well.
227 462 U.S. at 951.
228 462 U.S. at 957.
220
221
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when it invalidated the Line Item Veto Act, a federal law that authorized the President to “cancel” certain spending items after they were signed into law.229 The
Court stated that “[i]n both legal and practical effect, the President has amended
two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each.”230
Triggering the major questions doctrine by reference to the political controversy
surrounding a policy allows political opponents of that policy “in both legal and
practical effect,” to amend an Act of Congress by essentially “repealing a portion”
of an agency’s authority.231 Take the OSHA vaccine case; the statute there authorized the Secretary of Labor to promulgate “any occupational safety or health standard.”232 The Court concluded that the agency’s vaccination policy was a major question that couldn’t be promulgated under that broad, general grant of authority, but
instead needed to be “plainly authorize[d]” by statute because of the politicized
nature of vaccines, and because they were deemed a “significant encroachment”
and OSHA’s action “no ‘everyday exercise of federal power.’”233 The political controversy around vaccines meant the Court was not merely asking whether a vaccination policy fell within the statute’s broad grant of authority according to its term; it
instead altered the inquiry to ratchet up the required statutory specificity and clarity,
effectively creating a carveout from a broad statutory provision.
Yet the Court insists that the principal justification for the major questions doctrine is that it channels issues into the legislative process—forcing Congress to decide them—rather than allowing those issues to be decided elsewhere. In Justice
Gorsuch’s concurrence in the OSHA case, for example, he explained that “the major questions doctrine … ensures that the national government’s power to make
the laws … remains where Article I of the Constitution says it belongs”—namely,
the legislature, which acts through bicameralism and presentment.234 “There are
some ‘important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself.’”235 And yet the Court’s willingness to designate issues as major because they
are subject to political contestation seems to allow issues to be resolve outside the
legislature, rather than within it.236
In some respects, this element of the major questions doctrine functions like a
kind of delegation to future political parties and people to amend a statute outside
524 U.S. 417, 436 (1998).
Id. at 438.
231 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438. See Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE
L.J. 1548, 1557-68 (2016) (urging narrow reading of Clinton and illustrating why the decision
has hallmarks of non-delegation analysis).
232 29 U.S.C. 655(b).
233 Nat’l Federation of Indep Business v. DOL, 142 S. Ct. at 665.
234 NFIB, slip op. at 4 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. (explaining that the major questions
doctrine, like the nondelegation doctrine, is “designed to protect the separation of powers
and ensure that any new laws governing the lives of Americans are subject to the robust
democratic processes the Constitution demands”).
235 NFIB, slip op. at 6 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat.
1, 43 (1825)).
236 See West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at *22 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing that
an issue can be major when “state legislatures were engaged in a robust debate” over it).
229
230

DRAFT

39

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4165724

39

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 239 [2022]

of the formal legislative process.237 The doctrine allows political parties and people,
well after a statute was enacted, to create the conditions such that an agency policy
is deemed “major,” and therefore cannot be enacted under a broad grant of authority that otherwise would authorize it. In other words, the doctrine empowers laterin-time entities to carve out statutory exceptions by creating political controversy
around what an agency has done, and thus require explicit congressional authorization for an agency’s policy.
To further draw out the anti-formalist elements of the doctrine, it’s useful to
compare the major questions doctrine to other doctrines and theories about executive power when it comes to statutes. Consider questions about the executive
branch’s authority to decline to enforce federal statutes based on the President’s
enforcement discretion,238 or the doctrine of desuetude, a common law doctrine
that authorizes courts to abrogate long-unenforced criminal statutes.239 These theories and doctrines envision that the executive branch has the power to effectively
unmake laws—sometimes to the point where future executive officers may not be
able to reinvigorate statutes absent legislative authorization. The reasons why the
executive branch might have this kind of authority were explained by then-Judge
Antonin Scalia, who framed the issue this way:
Does what I have said mean that, so long as no minority interests
are affected, “important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls
of Congress, [can be] lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the
federal bureaucracy?” Of course it does—and a good thing, too.
Where no peculiar harm to particular individuals or minorities is in
question, lots of once-heralded programs ought to get lost or misdirected, in vast hallways or elsewhere. Yesterday’s herald is today’s
bore—although we judges, in the seclusion of chambers, may not
be au courant enough to realize it.240
In other words, Presidents and subordinate executive officials will decline to enforce laws that no longer command majority support.241 Judge Scalia, in the lecture,
justified lodging “[t]he ability to lose or misdirect laws” in the President as “one of

See supra text accompanying notes TK (explaining how the Court assesses political
significance in terms of the present day).
238 See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez & Adam B. Cox, The President and Immigration Law,
119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009).
239 Note, Desuetude, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2209, 2209 (2006); Leah M. Litman, Taking
Care of Federal Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1289, 1342 (2015).
240 Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 897 (1983).
241 Scalia, supra note 240, at 897-97; Heather Elliot, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 459, 489 (2008). See also Alexander M. Bickel, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 151-52 (2d ed. 1986) (suggesting laws do
not retain their authority over time, may no longer reflect current will, but may not be
repealed because they lose visibility).
237
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the prime engines of social change.”242 The lecture pointed to the example of how
“Sunday blue laws … were widely unenforced long before they were widely repealed—and had the first not been possible the second might never have occurred.”243
Whatever one might think about the President’s power to use enforcement discretion to better approximate the public’s views and public support for various
laws, the new major questions doctrine represents a further extension of an antiformalist approach to legislation. For one thing, executive enforcement discretion
can often be more formalized than the rough and tumble politicking that may generate the kind of controversy that would make a given issue a major question under
the Court’s doctrine. The executive branch is able to craft enforcement memoranda
laying out enforcement policies and the reasons behind them; some statutes even
delegate to agencies the power to forbear from enforcing certain statutory provisions.244 When the executive branch creates formal memoranda or exercises delegated authority under a statute, there is a concrete and specific manifestation of
political sentiment regarding a federal statute made by an entity (the executive
branch) who is accountable to the people, rather than some loose approximation
based on an informal survey of state and federal politics and political messaging
and intuition made by judges.
Additionally, the major questions doctrine inverts the institutional structure behind the models of legal change supporting doctrines such as desuetude. Thenjudge Scalia specifically drew a contrast between the executive branch’s assessment of
a given statute and courts’ assessment of a statute, suggesting that the executive
branch was in a better position to know about the public’s views or support for a
given statute than “judges, in the seclusion of chambers, [who] may not be au
courant enough to realize.”245 The major questions doctrine, by contrast, imagines
that courts are able to detect that a matter is so politically controversial that it requires clear congressional authorization when an administrative agency within the
executive branch has decided the policy is a good one. The doctrine thus empowers
courts to veto an agency’s policy on the ground that it is so politically controversial
it cannot be read as being authorized by the statute. Yet as then-Judge Scalia and
others have recognized, there are several reasons to think that the executive branch,
at least relative to courts, is generally in a better position to assess the political controversy around a given policy and whether the policy is nevertheless best pursued
in spite of that controversy.246 The executive branch is subject to reelection; and it
is in their interest to pursue policies for which there is a popular mandate.247 The
same is not true for the federal courts.

Scalia, supra, note 240, at 897.
Id.
244 See Deacon, Forbearance, supra note 231, at 1589.
245 Scalia, supra note 240, at 897.
246 See id.; see also Deacon, Forbearance, supra note 231, at 1569-74.
247 See Deacon, Forberance, supra note 231, at 1569-74, 1588-89; Litman, Taking Care,
supra note 239, at 1344-51.
242
243
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3. Politicization
The Court’s major question doctrine is also politicized in the sense that invites
courts to rely on politically and ideologically infused judgments. Triggering application of the doctrine based on whether a given policy is politically controversial is
uniquely susceptible to the kind of reasoning that ideologically aligns Justices’ articulated views with the political party that appointed them. After all, the doctrine
turns on courts’ assessment about whether a particular policy is politically controversial. It would not be particularly surprising for a judge’s assessment about what
is politically controversial or politically significant to align with their own
worldview, which these days is often closely aligned with that of the political party
that appointed them.
That seems to have played out in the recent major questions cases. Compare the
cases in which the Court has applied the major questions doctrine and the cases in
which the Court has not applied the doctrine. The Republican appointees on the
Court identified the Center for Disease Control’s moratorium on evictions during
the coronavirus pandemic as a major question because of its perceived political
significance. The reasons given for why the eviction moratorium was a politically
significant major question sounded in concerns reflecting the ideology and professed political philosophy of the Republican Party.248 Polling indicated that over
half of Democrats supported the CDC’s eviction moratorium, while just 15% of
Republican voters did.249 The same dynamics played out in the case challenging
OSHA’s rule governing workplaces. There, the Court’s reasons about the apparent
significance of COVID-19 vaccines tracked conservative commentators questioning the necessity of the COVID-19 vaccine.250 And there too, polling indicated that
a majority of Americans and a majority of Democrats supported a vaccine mandate,
whereas less than half of Republicans supported a general vaccine requirement and
only 35% supported a vaccine requirement for large companies.251 The same polling
disparities existed with respect to the Clean Power Plan.252 If these cases are any
indication, courts’ assessment regarding what issues are politically significant is
likely to track rather closely with the views of the political party that appointed
them—perhaps more so, or at least as much, than in other areas of law.
Now consider the agency matters that the Court has not identified as major questions. In Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, the then five Republican-appointed
See Leah M. Litman, “Hey Stephen”, 120 MICH. L. REV. 1109, 1114-15 (2022) (book
review).
249 Claire Williams, About 1 in 2 Voters Support New Eviction Moratorium, but They’re Uneasy
About the CDC’s Authority to Issue It, Morning Consult (Aug. 11, 2021), https://morningconsult.com/2021/08/11/cdc-eviction-ban-poll/.
250 See supra Part III.A.1.
251 Christian Gall, Most Americans continue to support vaccine mandates – and want more,
Northwestern Now (Oct 13, 2021), https://news.northwestern.edu/stories/2021/10/survey-shows-most-americans-continue-to-support-vaccine-mandatesand-want-more/.
252 Barry G. Rabe, Sarah B. Mills, Christopher Borick, Public support for regulation of power
plant emissions under the Clean Power Plan, Issues in Energy and Environmental Policy (Jan.
2015), at p. 3, https://closup.umich.edu/sites/closup/files/uploads/ieep-nsee-2015clean-power-plan.pdf.
248
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Justices on the Court upheld the Trump administration’s statutory authority to create exemptions from regulations that required employer health insurance policies
to cover certain forms of health care.253 All of those five Justices have signed onto
opinions invoking the major questions doctrine, but in this case they joined an
opinion reasoning that the Affordable Care Act gave the Health Resources & Services Administration “broad discretion” “to create the religious and moral exemptions.”254 The case involved an agency’s effort to exempt employers from covering
certain forms of contraception. That issue, and specifically the existence of exemptions from health insurance coverage for contraception, is an issue of national political significance insofar as it’s politically controversial; it is also economically significant as well.255 Yet that concern was nowhere evident in the Court’s opinion;
the Court did not require the statute to speak with the degree of specificity required
in the OSHA or CDC cases. Rather, it sufficed that the statute contained a “broad”
grant of authority to the agency, the very kind of authority that was not sufficient
in the OSHA or the CDC or the EPA cases.
Or take two examples involving Presidential authority. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a
majority of the Court concluded that the Authorization of Use of Military Force
Act gave the President the authority to detain American citizens.256 Nowhere did
the Act specifically mention the detention of American citizens.257 And there was
considerable political controversy surrounding the Bush administration’s detention
policies.258 And yet the Court was willing to read the statute as a capacious grant of
authority to the President, again because of its broad wording. The Court did not
require Congress to specifically authorize such a politically significant action. Or
take Trump v. Hawaii, a challenge to then President Trump’s policy of excluding
persons from several Muslim majority countries from entering the United States.259
That policy was certainly politically controversial, and there were widespread protests against it and many of President Trump’s immigration policies. Yet there too,
the Court did not even seem to perceive that question as significant; it certainly did
not allow the significance of that question to affect the Court’s analysis of the statute. Rather, the Court again rested on the fact that the statute in question “grants

253 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020). Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan concurred in a separate
opinion.
254 140 S. Ct. at 2381.
255 See, e.g., New York v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 414 F. Supp. 3d 475 (S.D.N.Y.
2019) (invoking major questions doctrine to construe exemption authority).
256 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
257 Id. at 510 (the act authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” or “harbored such organizations or persons, in
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such
nations, organizations or persons”).
258 How 9/11 Radically Expanded the Power of the US Government, Time (Sept 11, 2021),
https://time.com/6096903/september-11-legal-history/.
259 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
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the president broad discretion to suspend the entry” of noncitizens into the United
States.260 Again, statutory specificity was not required.
There are other examples, but the point remains: Judges may be more inclined
to perceive issues or policies as politically significant if the policies are opposed by
the political party that appointed the judge. That is not to say that judges are intentionally adopting the views of the party that appointed them. Rather, this tendency
simply reflects the fact that a judge’s worldview, as well as their assessments of the
political significance of a given policy, are more likely to align with the political
party that appointed them than with the political party that did not.261 And so the
currently articulated version of the major questions doctrine seems to facilitate that
kind of ideological, political judging.
4. Minority Rule
The focus on whether an agency rule is politically controversial exacerbates other
pathologies in the constitutional system as well. In particular, the new major questions doctrine provides an additional mechanism for the constitutional system’s
skew toward minority rule.
The constitutional system’s mechanisms for minority rule are, by this point, well
documented. Sandy Levinson has long argued that the Senate’s apportionment
scheme facilitates minority rule;262 this was also understood at the Founding.263 The
Electoral College’s winner take all system, which awards all of a state’s votes in the
Electoral College to the presidential candidate who won the popular vote in a state,
similarly allows a minority of national voters to select a President.264 More recently,
scholars have pointed out how subconstitutional mechanisms such as the filibuster,
which requires a supermajority of votes in the Senate, provide other mechanisms
allowing political minorities to govern.265
The Supreme Court itself facilitates a kind of minority rule. The countermajoritarian design of the Court, which is insulated from formal political feedback mechanisms like elections, enables a kind of minority rule.266 And more recently, the
Supreme Court’s decisions have facilitated minority rule in the legislative process.
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2407.
261 See Litman, Hey Stephen, supra note 248, at 1114.
262 Sanford Levinson, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTION AND THE CRISIS OF
GOVERNANCE 148–51 (2012); Sanford Levinson, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION:
WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG 6, 25-140 (2006).
263 See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 14, 1787), in 2
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 9 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) (describing the Senate as allowing “the minority [to] negative the will of the
majority”).
264 Jonathan Gould & David Pozen, Structural Biases in Structural Constitutional Law,
__ NYU L. REV. __, at 44, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3797051
265 Id. at 91-97.
266 See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritan Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
260
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In particular, the Supreme Court’s partisan gerrymandering decision,267 as well as
the Court’s decisions on federal voting rights protections,268 have increased the likelihood that a political party that loses the statewide popular vote could retain control of a state legislature. (Partisan gerrymandering allows a political party to draw
districts in ways that make it easier for them to retain power and harder for the
opposing party to obtain power.269 Vote dilution and voting preconditions that burden some groups more than others are other mechanisms that make it easier for
parties to obtain political power to an extent that outpaces the share of votes they
receive.270) At a minimum, the decisions enable a party to obtain legislative seats
that outpace the percentage of the popular vote the party secured.
The new major questions doctrine’s focus on political significance provides an
additional mechanism for minority rule.271 That’s not only because, as explained
above, the doctrine allows courts to point to minority political party opposition and
political controversy over an agency’s policy to require clear statutory authorization
for the policy.272 It’s also because of some of the particular indicia the Court uses
as evidence of political significance. Consider some of the reasoning in West Virginia
v. EPA about why the Court treated the EPA’s generation-shifting rules as a major
policy.273 The Court focused on subsequent legislative history, and specifically Congress’s failure to enact generation-shifting requirements, to assess whether the
EPA’s rule was major. The Court noted that the EPA had adopted “a regulatory
program that Congress had conspicuously and repeatedly declined to enact itself”274: Congress “has consistently rejected proposals to amend the Clean Air Act
to create” a cap-and-trade scheme, one kind of generation shifting requirement, as

Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019); Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The AntiCarolene Court, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 179.
268 Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Committee, 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021); Shelby County v.
Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
269 Stephanopoulos, Anti-Carolene, supra note 267, at 179.
270 For example, the federal courts granted three stays of decisions finding vote dilution
reduced the number of majority-minority districts in the House by 3; in most of these
states, the maps created a number of majority-minority districts that represented about half
of the minority’s demographic representation in the states. See Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S.
Ct. 879 (2022); Ardoin v. Robinson, 2022 WL 2312680 (June 28, 2022) (mem.); Alpha Phi
Alpha Fraternity Inc v. Raffensperger, Case No. 1:21-cv-05337-SCJ, Dkt. 134 (N. D. Ga. Feb.
28, 2022). (Black Alabamians represented almost 28% of the state, but could elect the candidate of their choice in 11% of the state’s districts. Caster v. Merrill, Case No. 2:21-cv01536, Dkt. 101 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2022)).
271 While this reasoning has taken on increased relevance in the latest major questions
cases, the Court had also noted in Brown & Williamson that “Congress considered and rejected several proposals to give the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco” when it instead
adopted other federal legislation regarding tobacco. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 14748.
272 See supra TAN TK-TK.
273 2022 WL 2347278.
274 2022 WL 2347278, at * 13.
267
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well as “similar measures, such as a carbon tax.”275 Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence
in West Virginia similarly emphasized that “Congress has debated the matter frequently” and has “‘declined’ to adopt legislation similar to the Clean Power Plan.”276
This kind of reasoning—that Congress had considered, but declined to adopt legislation codifying an agency’s regulatory program—appeared in the OSHA case,277
as well as the CDC eviction case.278
The Court’s reliance on Congress’s rejection of legislation embodying certain
policies to prevent agencies from promulgating those same policies may allow the
political party not in power to constrain the power of the party that is. A party that
controls the House, but not the Senate or the White House, can withhold consent
to a bill and therefore make it more likely a policy is deemed “major.” Even a political party that controls zero branches can similarly block policies through the filibuster. Refusing to go along with legislation that overlaps with an agency’s delegated authority will also restrict future administration’s statutory authority, even if
those future administrations enjoy widespread public support.
This turns the minority checks built into the system into a power held by a minority to effectively amend statutes. Typically, the Senate filibuster allows a political
minority to prevent new legislation from being enacted. That is a kind of minority
rule—it allows a political minority to thwart the agenda of the party in power in the
Senate. But the major questions doctrine allows the Senate filibuster to effectively
amend existing legislation—it allows a political minority to alter the scope of an
agency’s authority under a statute simply by refusing to enact a statute that overlaps
with the authority the agency has under an existing statute, either according to the
“best” interpretation of that statute and potentially even when the statute is unambiguous.
The Court’s other indicia of political significance also facilitate minority rule. For
example, some Justices treat debate in the states as evidence of political significance.
In his concurrence in West Virginia, Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court had previously concluded vaccine requirements were politically significant because “state
legislatures were engaged in robust debates” about them.279 Many such state legislatures are themselves the product of severe partisan gerrymandering.280 But even

Id. at *16.
Id. at *23 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
277 See NFIB, 142 S. Ct. at 666 (describing “the most noteworthy action concerning the
vaccine mandate by either House of Congress” as “a majority vote of the Senate disapproving the regulation on December 8, 2021”); id. at 667-68 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(“Congress has chosen not to afford OSHA—or any federal agency—the authority to issue
a vaccine mandate. Indeed, a majority of the Senate even voted to disapprove OSHA's
regulation.”).
278 Alabama Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2486-87 (when summarizing the regulatory
history, the Court noted that Congress “did not renew” its initial “120-day eviction moratorium” for certain properties).
279 2022 WL 2347278, at *22 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
280 See Miriam Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 176267 (2021)
275
276
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assuming state legislatures are representative of the people within those states, looking to political controversy in state legislatures (or local legislatures?) in order to
require clear congressional authorization for a given policy may be deeply undemocratic. How much state opposition does it take to block federal policy? The Justices do not say, but neither do they give any indication that it must be enough to
form a national majority.
The new major questions doctrine enables minority rule in other ways as well.
The West Virginia case in particular highlights how the doctrine might allow special
interests groups to come in and generate political controversy about an agency’s
statutory authority and nullify the legislative wins that a political majority was able
to secure in the legislative process. The Clean Air Act, the statute at issue in West
Virginia, is a supposed rarity under theories of political economy that maintain that
it is easier for smaller, organized interests to coordinate and overcome collective
action programs and secure wins in the political process than it is for broad, diffuse
coalitions (that may represent larger numbers of people) to do so.281 The unambiguously broad CAA represented a political process win for the public interest given
that the statute is supposed to benefit a broad, diffuse group.282 The new major
questions doctrine effectively allows special interest groups to later neuter such
achievements.283 By generating political controversy surrounding an issue already
settled by the political process, special interests groups effectively negate pieces of
a statute. This mechanism seems precisely backwards: It provides a 5,000-pound
weight on the interpretive scale in favor of special interests groups that are at a
comparative advantage in the political process and that can be deployed after those
groups have already lost through normal channels.284 That too facilitates a kind of
minority rule.285

Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 10-11 (1965); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure
Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 373-85, 395 (1983). See Lisa Heinzerling &
Frank Ackerman, Law and Economics for a Warming World, 1 HARV. L. & POLY’ REV. 331,
356 (2007) (“Academic theory now almost dismisses the possibility that public policy and
expenditures represent the public interest.”).
282 See Brunstein & Revesz, supra note 24, at 255-62; Heinzerling & Ackerman, supra
note 281, at 341 (“The effect of these arguments is . . . to encourage the Court to turn away
from plain language in the Clean Air Act authorizing the EPA to regulate all harmful air
pollutants.”).
283 See Heinzerling & Ackerman, supra note 281, at 341; Litman, Taking Care, supra note
239, at 1344-51.
284 Cf. Stephanopoulos, Anti-Carolene Court, supra note 267 (cataloguing other instances
where the Court seems to use a reverse political process theory that affords greater protection to groups more easily able to protect their interests in the political process).
285 An analogy to constitutional theory may help to underscore the point. In order to
explain and analyze constitutional precedent, Dick Fallon developed the concept of the
“superprecedent,” which refers to the category of cases that the Supreme Court should
never overrule. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107 (2008). Several Justices have invoked the
281
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B. Novelty, Democracy, and the Regulatory State
This Part unpacks the implications of the Court’s willingness to declare an agency
policy major—and therefore require clear congressional authorization for it—
based on the policy being a “novel” one. It shows how this approach to majorness
effectively nullifies an agency’s ability to exercise delegated authority in cases where
Congress would have had the most reason to rely on delegation to an agency, and
also where such delegation would likely be most effective. It argues that this aspect
of the new major questions doctrine leads to the appearance of minimalism and
makes the doctrine appear less significant and less consequential than it actually is
when, in fact, a focus on regulatory novelty turns the major questions doctrine into
a deregulatory cudgel that will do much of the work, and a more selective and politically targeted form of the work, that a revived nondelegation doctrine would do.
1. Novelty, Regulatory Authority, and Majorness
Increasingly, the perceived novelty of an agency’s policy, as well as the scope and
potential future implications of the agency’s broader theory of statutory authority,
have become indicia of a rule’s majorness. Both of these doctrinal trends also mirror parallel developments in constitutional law.
a. Regulatory Anti-Novelty

concept at their confirmation hearings. See, e.g., Brian Naylor, Barrett Says She Does Not Consider Roe v. Wade ‘Super-Precedent,’ NPR (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court-confirmation/2020/10/13/923355142/barrett-says-abortion-rights-decision-not-a-super-precedent; C-SPAN, Judge Gorsuch Says He
Won’t Call Roe v. Wade a “Super Precedent,” C_SPAN (March 21, 2017), https://www.cspan.org/video/?c4662290/judge-gorsuch-call-roe-v-wade-super-precdent. Whether a Supreme Court decision qualifies as a superprecedent, and thus should not be overruled, Fallon explained, turns in part on whether the decision “deals with matters that no longer
occasion broad, ongoing, unstable contestation in American law and politics.” Fallon, supra,
at 1149. In her confirmation hearings, Justice Barrett explained that whether a case qualified as a superprecedent depended on whether “calls to overrule it have [] ceased.” Naylor,
supra. This feature of stare decisis turns on the political landscape. It makes the inquiry
about respect for precedent turn whether the public and political actors have accepted a
decision of the Supreme Court: If they have accepted it, then the decision is safe. If they
have not, then the decision can be overruled. This doctrinal or theoretical structure, then,
seems to create an incentive for judges, political parties, and members of the public to
never accept and to continually contest Supreme Court decisions with which they disagree;
at a minimum, it judicially solidifies political opposition to precedent into a judicial mechanism for less respect for that precedent. The major questions doctrine is almost the inverse of this aspect of the superprecedent concept. If the public and political actors have
not accepted the agency’s decision, then the decision must be explicitly authorized by statute. But if they have accepted the agency’s decision – or at least if they have not mounted
a sustained campaign against it – then the agency’s decision may not have to be explicitly
authorized by statute.
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The Court’s major question cases have increasingly relied on an anti-novelty
principle that was first fleshed out in the Court’s constitutional law cases. In constitutional federalism and separation of powers cases, the Court has reasoned repeatedly that legislative novelty—the fact that a federal statute is novel in some
respects—is a sign that the statute is unconstitutional.286 The Court’s now standard
formulation of the constitutional anti-novelty principle is that “the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem with [a statute] is the lack of historical
precedent.”287
A parallel skepticism of regulatory novelty is now firmly part of the major questions doctrine. In the major questions cases, of course, novelty is used to interpret
a statute, rather than the Constitution: The novelty of an agency’s regulatory approach is an indication that the policy is major and therefore likely not authorized
by statute. Similar to the origins of the constitutional anti-novelty rhetoric, the regulatory anti-novelty rhetoric began with the passing observation, in FDA v. Brown
& Williamson, that the agency had asserted a new and different authority to regulate
the tobacco industry.288 The Court noted that the agency’s assertion of authority to
regulate tobacco was “[c]ontrary to its representations to Congress since 1914.”289
Since Brown & Williamson, the novelty of an agency’s regulation has increasingly
featured in the Court’s major question cases and has also taken on additional significance. It has now hardened into a central principle guiding the application of
the doctrine. When the Court concluded that the CDC lacked the authority to impose a moratorium on evictions, for example, the Court concluded its analysis of
the merits with this observation: “This claim of expansive authority under 361(a) is
unprecedented. Since that provision’s enactment in 1944, no regulation premised
on it has even begun to approach the size or scope of the eviction moratorium.”290
Subsequently, in the OSHA vaccine-and-testing case, the Court articulated the
anti-novelty principle even more strongly, and explicitly incorporated the Court’s
constitutional anti-novelty line of cases. The Court reasoned:
It is telling that OSHA, in its half century of existence, has never
before adopted a broad public health regulation of this kind—addressing a threat that is untethered, in any causal sense, from the
workplace. This ‘lack of historical precedent,’ coupled with the
breadth of authority that the Secretary now claims, is a ‘telling indication’ that the mandate extends beyond the agency’s legitimate
reach. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010).

See generally Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407 (2017).
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010).
288 On the origins of constitutional antinovelty see Litman, supra note 286, at 1410,
1415-16.
289 529 U.S. at 159.
290 Alabama Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489.
286
287
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Finally, in West Virginia, the Court similarly relied on the purported regulatory novelty of the EPA’s generation shifting requirements as an indication that the agency
had adopted a major rule.291
b. Scope and Implications of Authority
The Court’s major question cases have also incorporated another element of
constitutional jurisprudence into their assessment of whether a rule is major. The
more recent major questions cases ask not just whether an agency’s rule is major,
but also whether the scope and implications of the theory that justifies the agency’s
rule could lead to other potentially major policies not currently before the Court.
This aspect of the major questions doctrine resembles an interpretive method
that the Court has come to use in constitutional law cases that examine the scope
of Congress’s powers, often under the commerce clause.292 There, in order to analyze whether a particular statute falls within the scope of Congress’s powers, the
Court asks what other statutes Congress might be able to enact were it able to enact
the one that it did enact, and that is before the Court. If the answer to that question
includes hypothetically possible, but practically unlikely, far-reaching exercises of
federal authority, that is a mark against the federal statute. And if the theory justifying the federal statute would or could justify something akin to plenary congressional authority, that is a reason to invalidate the statute as exceeding Congress’s
powers.293 Thus, in United States v. Lopez, the Court concluded that Congress lacked
the authority under the Commerce Clause to prohibit gun possession in schools in
part because if the Court “were to accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate.”294 Similarly, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, all of the
Justices who concluded that Congress lacked the authority to enact the minimumcoverage requirement under the Commerce Clause relied on the idea that, were the
minimum-coverage requirement constitutional, then Congress could regulate near
anything.295
This kind of analysis now appears to be a part of the major questions doctrine.
The Court entertains hypotheticals about what the agency might do if its current
regulation were authorized by statute. And if some of those hypothetical policies
that an agency might have the statutory authority to enact strike the Court as odd
See 2022 WL 2347278, at *13-14.
See, e.g., Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576, 591-92 (2014)
(describing mode of analysis).
293 Primus, Limits of Enumeration, supra note 292, at 591.
294 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
295 See 567 U.S. at 553 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“[T]he Government’s logic would
justify a mandatory purchase to solve almost any problem.”); id. at 655 (Scalia et al dissenting) (“The Government was invited, at oral argument, to suggest what federal controls
over private conduct … could not be justified …. It was unable to name any. As we said at
the outset, whereas the precise scope of the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause is uncertain, the proposition that the Federal Government cannot do everything is a fundamental precept.”).
291
292

DRAFT

50

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/239
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4165724

50

Deacon and Litman:

or themselves major, then that becomes a reason to conclude that the current policy
presents a major question that needs to be explicitly authorized by statute.
Earlier iterations of the major question doctrine focused on whether the particular policy that an agency had adopted qualified as major. Thus, FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corporation analyzed “the nature of” the FDA’s “assert[ing] jurisdiction to regulate … tobacco products,”296 i.e., what it had done in the particular
case, and King v. Burwell focused on the specific question the agency had addressed
in that case—whether tax credits were available on health care exchanges established by the federal government.297
The particular policy or particular rule that an agency has adopted remain part
of how the major questions doctrine operates today. But the more recent major
questions cases have added another inquiry. This inquiry involves an assessment of
what an agency could theoretically do in the future if a court were to conclude that
the agency’s existing policy was authorized by statute. That is, rather than assessing
whether the particular policy that the agency has adopted is major, the Court now
assesses whether any conceivable policy that the agency might have the authority
to adopt would be major. That inquiry sweeps in unlikely-to-materialize, but theoretically possible, policies that seem to have an aura of majorness and are more
likely to code as politically significant. Take Alabama Association of Realtors, which
examined the CDC’s moratorium on evictions in certain places.298 In addition to
assessing whether the agency policy at issue in the case, a moratorium on evictions,
was major, the Court incorporated into its major questions analysis the possibility
that the CDC would be able to “mandate free grocery delivery to the homes of the
sick or vulnerable”; “require[] manufacturers to provide free computers to enable
people to work from home”; or “order telecommunications companies to provide
free high-speed Internet service to facilitate remote work.”299 It was that “claim of
expansive authority” that the Court subjected to an inquiry into majorness.300 Likewise, in West Virginia v. EPA, the Court evaluated the majorness of the EPA’s rule
by asking what else the agency could do under its theory of statutory authority.301
***

529 U.S. at 159.
297 576 U.S. at 485-86.
298 141 S. Ct. 2485.
299 141 S. Ct. at 2489.
300 See id. See also Nat’l Federation of Indep. Business v. Dept of Labor, 142 S. Ct. at 665
(“Permitting OSHA to regulate the hazards of daily life—simply because most Americans
have jobs and face those same risks while on the clock—would significantly expand
OSHA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.”).
301 2022 WL 2347278, at *15 (“[O]n this view of EPA’s authority, it could go further,
perhaps forcing coal plants to ‘shift’ away virtually all of their generation—i.e., to cease
making power altogether.”).
296
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Before assessing the implications of these indicia of majorness, it is worth pausing over the fact that these indicia, like the political significance indicia of majorness, also have at most a tangential relationship to discerning statutory meaning.302
The regulatory antinovelty principle’s relationship to statutory text becomes apparent by analyzing how the justifications supposedly underlying the constitutional
anti-novelty principle apply (or not) to the parallel regulatory version of the antinovelty principle.
One justification for the constitutional antinovelty principle is that the novelty
of a federal statute is an indication that prior Congresses “believed” that they lacked
the constitutional power to enact the statute.303 But many of the reasons why novelty is not a reliable indication that prior Congresses thought that a statute was
unconstitutional also demonstrate why novelty is likewise not a reliable indication
that previous agencies thought a regulation exceeded the agency’s authority under
a statute. For one, while the procedures that constrain agency policymaking are not
as cumbersome as the procedures that constrain Congress’s power to make laws,
the constraints on agencies are still substantial and limit what an agency might do.304
So the difficulty of adopting rules is a reason why an agency might not exercise the
full scope of its statutory authority within a few years following the statute’s enactment.
Further, one of the most important limits on agencies’ authority is grounded in
the Administrative Procedure Act: agencies can only pursue policies that are supported by reasoned decisionmaking, which includes demonstrating that there is a
rational connection between the facts on the ground and the decision made.305
Therefore, the facts and social context that exist in the real world must provide
support for an agency’s policy apart from whether the formal language in the statute
might allow it.306 And that evidentiary-based limit supplies an important reason that
might explain regulatory novelty—changes at the societal level.307 Relevant changes
might include a subsequent regulation that requires the agency to make adjustments, or a judicial decision that altered the regulatory or statutory landscape.308
Say, for example, that an agency with overlapping jurisdiction adopted a new regulation that requires an agency to recalibrate its existing regulatory approach; or that
302 On why the major questions doctrine itself, even earlier iterations of it, did not
supply a sensible account of statutory interpretation, see Emerson, supra note 153, at 204959, 2073-87, and Heinzerling, Power Canons, supra note 2, at 1947, 1957-60, 1966-69, 198690.
303 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 907-908 (““[T]he numerousness of these statutes, contrasted
with the utter lack of statutes imposing obligations on the States’ executive (notwithstanding the attractiveness of that course to Congress), suggests an assumed absence of such
power.”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 744 (1999) (“[E]arly Congresses did not believe they
had the power to authorize private suits against the States in their own courts.”).
304 Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345, 360-64 (2019).
305 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E); Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the
United States, Inc. v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
306 See id.
307 Litman, supra note 286, at 1437.
308 Litman, supra note 286, at 1435.
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a judicial decision has foreclosed one regulatory approach but opened up new ones.
An agency may shift gears in light of those developments. Or there might have
been some changes in markets or society more broadly that alter the field in which
an agency is regulating,309 like when a novel pandemic shuts down entire sectors of
the market. That might explain why, for example, the OSHA had never previously
adopted a vaccination requirement, or why the CDC had never previously concluded that a moratorium on evictions would restrict the spread of disease. Or we
might develop new knowledge about, say, the harm caused by cigarettes and their
intended effects.310 Alternatively, an agency’s priorities or its assessment of the
costs and benefits or political landscape might have shifted.311 That arguably occurred in West Virginia: despite claims that the Clean Power Plan’s metrics were
unattainable without substantial economic consequences, the power industry
achieved the metrics before the target dates.312 Having seen that, the agency sought
to adapt its views going forward.313 That too might cause an agency to pursue a new
regulatory approach.
This is not an exhaustive list of all of the circumstances or scenarios that might
lead to regulatory novelty; it does, however, underscore that there are myriad reasons why an agency might not adopt a particular regulation aside from the agency
thinking that it lacks the statutory authority to do so—reasons why regulatory novelty does not signal an agency’s (or anyone’s) views about the meaning of a statute.
Indeed, the federal government argued that OSHA adopted the vaccination policy
only after it had concluded that the measures adopted to date by employers were
not effective in controlling the spread of COVID-19.314 So the fact that the agency
took a new course in response to a developing problem could just reflect an
agency’s response to changed circumstances and new information; it is not a reliable
proxy for an agency’s view that it lacked certain kinds of authority under a statute.
The other justifications for the constitutional antinovelty principle similarly underscore why regulatory antinovelty is not a reliable proxy for statutory meaning. A
second justification for the constitutional antinovelty principle is that novelty might
be evidence of actual unconstitutionality.315 But there is no reason why regulatory
novelty would be evidence about the actual meaning of a statute, particularly when
a delegation is framed in unambiguously broad and capacious terms that Congress
expected an agency to apply to changing circumstances.316 A third justification for
Litman, supra note 286, at 1438.
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 120.
311 Litman, supra note 286, at 1443.
312 See West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at *28 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The ensuing
years, though, proved the Plan's moderation. Market forces alone caused the power industry to meet the Plan’s nationwide emissions target—through exactly the kinds of generation
shifting the Plan contemplated.”).
313 See id.
314 Brief of Federal Government Respondents, West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at pp.
2-3; 61 Fed. Reg. at 61, 430, 61, 444, 61, 409, 61,411-61, 417, 61.
315 Litman, supra note 286, at 1454.
316 See Heinzerling, Power Canons, supra note 2, at 1938.
309
310
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the constitutional antinovelty principle is that the novelty of a federal statute supplies a second-best principle to constrain Congress’s powers given that the Court’s
cases have allowed Congress more constitutional powers than Congress actually
possesses.317 But this argument also doesn’t map onto cases involving statutory interpretation where there isn’t a similar body of judicial precedent that the Court
might be trying to rein in. What the Court is limiting is the statute itself, and there
isn’t a good reason to think that regulatory novelty is a reliable indicator of statutory
meaning.
2. Nullify Effective Delegations
What the increasing importance of both regulatory novelty and the broader future implications of the agency’s asserted statutory authority does do is limit the
effectiveness of congressional delegations to agencies. In particular, by limiting an
agency’s authority to familiar contexts, the Court undermines the reasons why Congress might delegate to an agency in the first place. As a result, this aspect of the
major questions doctrine hobbles delegations in circumstances in which Congress
is most likely to rely on a delegatory approach, and in circumstances where delegations are most likely to be an effective governance strategy. And it means that the
major questions doctrine is increasingly performing the work that a revived nondelegation doctrine would do—nullifying delegations where Congress has reason
to rely on them.
Consider two standard justifications for delegations to agencies: expertise and
flexibility. One justification for broad delegations to agencies is the expertise and
information that agencies bring to bear on particular questions.318 Administrative
agencies usually have large professional staffs with specialized training and experience with particular regulatory issues.319 In contrast, Congress has a far smaller,
more generalist group of workers.320 Thus, the argument goes, “to the extent we
want policies made by persons who know what they are doing, it is better that
policymaking be centered in the administrative agencies rather than in Congress.”321
Agency expertise comes in a variety of forms. Agency officials are often professionals in their respective fields, and so they contribute their pre-existing knowledge
and training to the task of creating and implementing policy. For example, the CDC
relies on epidemiologists to evaluate the reliability of public-health studies,322 and

Litman, supra note 286, at 1479.
318 E.g., Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548, 1582 (2016);
Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role
of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 127 (2005).
319 Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2151–52 (2004).
320 Id. at 2151.
321 Id.
322 Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1108 (2015).
317
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multiple agencies rely on trained economists to generate credible cost-benefit assessments.323 However, agencies also benefit from expertise that is acquired from
exposure and experience. Agency staff “will come to know deeply the web of laws
that they are delegated to administer or those that intersect with their turf, plus
subsequent implementing regulations, guidance documents, and court decisions.”324 And, “as repeat players in frequent political contact with congressional
committees, the public, and more directly implicated stakeholders, agencies will
come to know how various regulatory choices work or could be improved.”325
A related justification for delegation rests on agencies’ flexibility. Thanks in part
to how rulemaking procedures work, agencies are relatively well-positioned to adapt
and revise policies to meet changing circumstances and new information.326 That
flexibility can be invaluable in the face of unpredictable situations like the COVID19 pandemic. Regulatory flexibility allows agencies to develop policies through trialand-error experimentation;327 agencies can also implement innovative new policies
in the face of uncertainty and use data about the resulting feedback to formulate
more effective policies in the future.328 In contrast, Congress works with several
institutional features that make flexible adaptations more difficult. The legislative
process makes it difficult to enact federal statutes.329 Proposed legislation must pass
through countless “vetogates,” including the bicameralism and presentment requirements, internal roadblocks within each congressional chamber, and the need
for supermajorities to overcome Senate filibusters.330 As a result, Congress cannot
move as quickly or as efficiently as agencies can; updating or revisiting prior legislation imposes enormous practical costs.
The power of the “expertise” and “flexibility” justifications for delegations to
agencies have led some to claim that delegation is a practical necessity in light of
the scale of modern government.331 The Supreme Court has noted that ‘‘Congress
simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives.”332 As Justice Kagan later wrote, if relatively open-ended delegations to

Id. at 1109.
William W. Buzbee, The Tethered President: Consistency and Contingency in Administrative
Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1367 (2018).
325
Id.
326 E.g., Deacon, supra note 231, at 1585; Stephenson, supra note TK, at 139; 453 Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine,
81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 453 (2008).
327 Deacon, supra note 231, at 1585–86; see also Stephenson, supra note TK, at 140.
328 See Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 483–84
(1989); see also Zachary Gubler, Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. REV. 129 (2014).
329 E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1441, 1441 (2008).
330 Id. at 1444–48.
331 E.g., Merrill, supra note TK, at 2155 (“[B]road delegation is necessary if government
is to realize the ambitious agenda it has set for itself.”).
332 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
323
324
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agencies are not permissible, “then most of Government is unconstitutional—dependent as Congress is on the need to give discretion to executive officials to implement its programs.”333
Part of what is striking about the new major questions cases is that the justifications for delegations to agencies—the reasons why Congress might rely on delegations to agencies—now overlap with the reasons the Court has identified to be
skeptical of an agency’s authority. As a result, the Court’s major questions doctrine
undermines the very bases for delegation, turning the reasons why Congress might
rely on delegations to agencies into reasons to narrowly construe and limit the reach
of the delegations in the circumstances in which the delegations are likely to be
used and likely to be needed for effective governance.
Take the expertise rationale for delegations. The premise of the expertise rationale is that Congress is not likely to know how or when or in what context a
particular goal might be achieved. When Congress operates under those conditions,
the thinking goes, it may rely on a delegatory approach and delegate authority to an
agency. Yet the major questions doctrine requires Congress to anticipate many of
the means that an agency might use to pursue a particular goal. The fact that Congress did not anticipate and spell out a particular method of regulation is no longer
a reason why Congress might use a broad delegation to an agency; it is now a reason
why a delegation may not be put toward a particular use.
Or consider the flexibility rationale for delegations to agencies. The premise behind this rationale is that there may be unanticipated problems or crises or just
factual developments that arise that may require adaptation along the way. Here
too, when Congress legislates in a field where this might be true, it may rely on a
delegatory approach. Yet here too, the major questions doctrine requires Congress
to anticipate and spell out the circumstances that might precipitate an agency action,
as well as the possible responses that an agency might adopt. This too inverts the
reasons why Congress might rely on and might need to rely on delegations into the
bases for restricting the delegations.
Nor may it work for Congress to attempt ex ante to specify a wide range of
different approaches that an agency might take in a given area, hoping that one of
them will bear future fruit. For one, due to its lack of expertise Congress may guess
wrong and fail to include the measure that would actually prove effective. And there
are also costs to over-specification. Using the expressio unius canon, courts might
find that policies other than those specified are impliedly prohibited.334 Or, using
the canons noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, courts may limit agencies to adopting
policies similar to those specified, even when Congress has included a catch-all
phrase.335 In other words, there are good reasons for Congress to rely on broad,
general terms such as it did in section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act. Applying the
major questions doctrine when Congress does so puts Congress in a very difficult
position.
Understood in this way, the Court’s major questions doctrine seems to undermine the bases for delegation—not in a formal, constitutional sense by preventing
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019) (Kagan, J., plurality opinion).
334 See generally NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 940 (2017).
335 See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1085 (2015).
333
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Congress from using delegations—but in a practical sense that makes it difficult to
realize the full benefits of delegation. These dynamics were on display in the Court’s
major questions cases. Consider the OSHA testing-or-vaccination policy that the
Court invalidated by relying on the major questions doctrine.336 There, the Court
claimed that it was “telling that OSHA, in its half century of existence, has never
before adopted a broad public health regulation of this kind.”337 But since the Occupational Safety and Health Act had been enacted in 1970, the agency had not
faced a pandemic similar to COVID-19. The regulatory novelty was a product of
the flexibility that delegations typically afford agencies to adapt to changed circumstances.338 The possibility that changed factual circumstances might call for new,
prompt action was traditionally a justification for delegation, and may have been
why Congress relied on a delegatory approach in this context. Yet the Court treated
it as a reason to be skeptical of an agency’s exercise of its delegated authority.
These dynamics were also on display in West Virginia. There, the EPA promulgated a rule, the Clean Power Plan, that adopted some generation shifting requirements for coal and natural gas fired power plants. These requirements, the agency
explained, were needed “[c]onsidering the direction that the power sector has been
taking and the changes that it is undergoing.”339 The agency also explained that
generation shifting was possible because of “advancements and innovation in
power sector technologies.”340 So the EPA’s knowledge about the changing circumstances in the technologically complicated power sector purportedly supplied the
occasion for a new regulatory approach; the fact that pollution and air quality are
topics that are scientifically complex and rapidly evolving may also be reasons why
Congress relied on a delegatory approach. Yet the Court treated the new regulatory
approach as an indicia of majorness, even though it may have been the very reason
why Congress relied on a delegation in the first place.
3. Deregulatory Faux Minimalism
This section explains how the new major questions doctrine gives rises to an air
of faux minimalism when in reality, the doctrine operates as a powerful deregulatory
weapon that may accomplish some of the goals of a revived nondelegation doctrine,
but in a more tailored and politically selective way.
Because the major questions doctrine rests on a rule of statutory interpretation,
the decisions invoking the major questions doctrine sometimes end being described
as minimalist. For example, after the Court’s decision in the OSHA case, Professor
Daniel Farber wrote that, in light of the decisions, “[i]t looks like the moderates,”
by which he meant Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett,

142 S. Ct. 661 (2022).
Id. at 666.
338 See, e.g., Litman, supra note 286, at 1437-48 (noting that legislative novelty is often
in response to precipitating changes); Deacon, supra note 231.
339 80 Fed. Reg. 64595. See also 80 Fed. Reg. 64694 (“Today, the electricity sector is
undergoing a period of intense change.”).
340 80 Fed. Reg. 64696.
336
337
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“aren’t game for a massive attack on regulatory power.”341 And Professor Aaron
Tang proposed that OSHA could require high quality masking and testing, even if
it could not require vaccines.342 And indeed, in some respects the major questions
decisions are minimalist, at least relative to other alternative bases for the decisions,
because the decisions formally hold out the possibility that Congress may amend
the statute to authorize the relevant agency action.343
But in practice and effect, the Court’s application of the major questions doctrine
may not be particularly minimalist. Consider how the doctrine works with respect
to statutes already in existence. When Congress drafted the many statutes that delegate authority to administrative agencies, it did so without thinking that it had to
specify every possible major form of regulation that an agency might undertake.
And so the statutes may be written in relatively clear or even unambiguous, but also
capacious and general, terms—rather than in a way that authorize particular policies
that might code to later courts as major. Even if Congress could, ex ante, predict
what forms of regulation might later be identified as major, Congress did not draft
most of the important federal regulatory statutes currently in existence with
knowledge of the presumption that it had to authorize certain forms of regulation
explicitly, rather than by speaking in broad terms.
Similar problems could also arise with respect to statutes that Congress sought
to enact today, even against the backdrop of the new major questions doctrine.
Even if Congress sought to draft a statute that delegated authority to an administrative agency, while knowing that the current Court requires “major” agency initiatives to be explicitly authorized, it is unrealistic and unlikely that Congress could,
at the time of drafting, both foresee and spell out every possible form of regulation
that would be perceived as major at some point in the future, much less specify
every possible form of regulation that an agency might pursue to advance its mandate. And as Part III.B.2 explained, the very reason why Congress might rely on a
delegatory approach is that Congress might not know and might not be able to
anticipate how an agency could leverage its expertise to respond to changing circumstances and advance a particular policy goal.
The difficulty of amending statutes also makes these decisions more practically
significant than they might seem. It is a vast understatement to say that passing
legislation is difficult.344 The hypothetical possibility that Congress could amend a
statute to authorize a particular agency action will, in most cases, remain just that—
a hypothetical, not a reality. And that’s true even if or when an agency action was
authorized by a capacious, but general, grant of authority in a statute and even if or
when that agency action enjoys majority popular support.

341 Daniel Farber, Today’s Vaccine Cases: Implications for Climate Change Regulation, LegalPlanet (Jan. 13, 2022), available at https://legal-planet.org/2022/01/13/todays-vaccinecases-implications-for-climate-change-regulation/.
342 Aaron Tang, Here’s how Biden can fix the Supreme Court’s terrible mistake in the vax or mask
case, L.A. Times (Jan. 15, 2022), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2022-01-15/supreme-court-osha-vaccination-mandate-joe-biden.
343 Cf. Part I.B (describing nondelegation doctrine).
344 See supra TAN TK-TK.
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Given the “prevailing political geography of the United States,” moreover, the
Court’s major question doctrine provides a comparative advantage to the Republican Party’s likely levers of political power relative to those of the Democratic
Party.345 As Jonathan Gould and David Pozen have written, “a host of longstanding structural arrangements” make it easier for the Republican Party to obtain political power in the United State Congress.346 The apportionment scheme of the
Senate, which skews representation toward less diverse and smaller states, as well
as state legislatures’ power to draw gerrymandered districts for federal Congressional seats, make it easier for Republicans to hold majorities in both houses of
Congress.347 As a result, Democrats find it harder to win political power in Congress, and harder to enact their preferred policies through legislation. That is particularly true given the existence of the filibuster, which in effect requires Democrats to win supermajority control of the Senate, an institution that is structurally
stacked against the current Democratic Party, in order to advance policy goals that
require legislation.348
This means that the Democratic Party may be more likely to try and effectuate
their preferred policies through the executive branch and administrative agencies
rather than through legislation. And the major questions doctrine, which limits the
executive branch’s power relative to the federal legislature’s and the federal courts,
constrains their ability to do so. It accordingly doctrinally reinforces “perceived,
and actual, partisan advantage,” no small or minimalist development.349
The major questions doctrine cases are more consequential than they might seem
for other reasons as well. The increasing importance of regulatory novelty, together
with the Court’s focus on the implications of the agency’s theory of authority, make
the major questions doctrine into a powerful deregulatory tool with effects similar
to decisions based on the nondelegation doctrine, but under the guise of statutory
interpretation. In theory, the decisions allow for Congress to amend a statute so as
to authorize a particular agency action. But in practice, that congressional response
is unlikely to materialize—and even if it does, it will be hard for Congress to craft
effective delegations. For that reason, the major questions decisions have the effect
of severely restricting agencies from adopting regulations pursuant to generally
worded congressional statutes. That result shares much in common with reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine, even if the two do not overlap completely. Those similarities are further reinforced because, as Part III.B.2 explained, the Court’s reasons
for skepticism of an agency’s authority overlap with the reasons why Congress

345 Jonathan Gould & David Pozen, Structural Biases in Structural Constitutional Law,
__ NYU L. Rev. __, at 44, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3797051.
346 Jonathan Gould & David Pozen, Structural Biases in Structural Constitutional Law,
__ NYU L. Rev. __, at 44, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3797051.
347 Gould and Pozen also discuss how the Electoral College system for selecting the
President does the same, but not to the same extent as Congress. Id. at 44.
348 Id. at 25-30.
349 Cf. Stephanopoulos, Anti-Carolene Court, supra note 267, at 178.

DRAFT

59

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4165724

59

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 239 [2022]

might rely on delegations. This means the major questions doctrine limits Congress’s ability to rely on broad delegations to agencies in the circumstances where
Congress may be most likely to do so—namely, to respond to changing circumstances or unforeseen developments using agencies’ superior expertise and flexibility.
Moreover, the emphasis on both the regulatory novelty of the agency’s policy
and the theoretical implications of an agency’s claim of statutory authority are well
tailored to effect deregulation. 350 The regulatory antinovelty bent seems to limit an
agency to adopting rules that address problems that the agency tackled in the first
few years after a statute’s enactment; at a minimum is seems to limit an agency to
use regulatory means that the agency used in the same early time period. This turns
statutory delegations to an agency into “use it or lose it” grants of power: In order
to retain the powers granted to it, an agency has to exercise those powers within
some ill-defined period of years after a statute’s enactment. In particular, it’s not
clear how many regulations an agency has to adopt before establishing a basis for
its regulatory authority. Nor is it clear over what time horizon—that is how soon
after a statute’s enactment—it has to adopt them.
It is not difficult to see how a “use it or lose it” approach to regulatory authority
operates as a deregulatory tool. It will result in agencies losing powers they possess
under general and otherwise unambiguous grants of statutory authority. Again consider the Clean Air Act’s grant of authority to the EPA to develop the “best system
of emission reduction … adequately demonstrated” “taking into account the cost
of achieving such reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements.”351 As Justice Kagan noted in dissent, “the parties
do not dispute that generation shifting is indeed the ‘best system’—the most effective and efficient way to reduce power plants’ carbon dioxide emissions.”352 But the
majority concluded that the EPA did not possess the authority to adopt that best
system in part because the agency had never tried that regulatory approach until
2015, 45 years after the relevant statute’s enactment.353 An agency’s powers thus
effectively shrink over time if the agency does not use them to the full extent.
This, too, undermines the effectiveness of delegations, which were supposed to
provide agencies with flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances. The regulatory
novelty principle limits agencies to relying on the set of methods or the modes of
regulation that the agency adopted over some initial time period. Consider how that
might work in the context of the EPA. When the Clean Air Act was adopted in the
1970s, the EPA might have focused on one kind of pollution—say, visible pollution
causing short-term health effects. But later, the EPA might address other kinds of
350 Cf. Heinzerling, Power Canons, supra note 2, at 1938 (explaining how the Court’s cases
“mask a judicial agenda hostile to a robust regulatory state”).
351 7411(a)(1)
352 2022 WL 2347278, at *28 (Kagan, J., dissenting). See also id., at *17 (“As a matter of
‘definitional possibilities,’ FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 407 (2011), generation shifting
can be described as a ‘system’—‘an aggregation or assemblage of objects united by some
form of regular interaction,’ Brief for Federal Respondents 31—capable of reducing emissions.”).
353 2015 WL 2347278, at *13-14.
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pollution, perhaps because scientific or technological developments identified
other sources of pollution, or because industries and markets have changed, leading
to new sources of pollution. The regulatory novelty approach would require the
agency to regulate new possible sources of pollution or newly identified pollutants
the same way it regulated old ones. That limitations restricts an agency’s ability to
tailor its regulatory approach to new problems and to leverage its expertise to develop new solutions to address new problems.
The same goes for the Court’s focus on the possible implications of the theory
of authority underlying an agency’s rule. This too makes the Court’s major questions doctrine err on the side of deregulation because it allows the Court to consider
additional rules that the agency might adopt aside from the one that it did. By expanding the universe of rules or regulations to assess for majorness, this increases
the odds that the Court will find that an issue is major and require clear statutory
authorization for it.
The major questions doctrine thus seems to embed deregulatory preferences in
the Court’s methods of statutory interpretation. Indeed, Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in West Virginia seemed to specifically link the major questions doctrine to
deregulation. He wrote that “with the explosive growth of the administrative state
since 1970 the major questions doctrine soon took on special importance.”354 During that period “Congress created dozens of new federal administrative agencies”
and “[t]oday, Congress issues ‘roughly two hundred to four hundred laws’ every
year, while ‘federal administrative agencies adopt something on the order of three
thousand to five thousand final rules.’”355 Instead of treating the rise of delegations
as evidence of Congress’s choice to provide agencies with flexibility and broad authority, this uses the major questions doctrine to push back against Congress’s regulatory choices. That is also how then-Judge Kavanaugh described the doctrine: the
major questions doctrine “operates as a vital check on expansive and aggressive
assertions of executive authority.”356 And here too, that accomplishes an important
part of what a revived nondelegation doctrine would do.
Unlike a revived nondelegation approach, however, the major questions doctrine
provides a more selective, and targeted, deregulatory tool. As Part III.A.3 argued,
judges seem more likely to designate a policy as politically significant, and therefore
major, when the policy is opposed by the political party that appointed the judge.
That means, given the composition of the United States Supreme Court, Democratic administration’s agency initiatives are more likely to be deemed major, and
therefore more likely to be invalidated, than Republican administration’s agency
initiatives. The “perceived, and actual, partisan advantage” of the doctrine might
suggest that relative importance of the doctrine should be not minimized, even
compared to other possible alternatives.357
The appearance of faux minimalism in the Court’s major questions doctrine may
be of more than academic interest. If the Court’s decisions are consistently depicted
West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at *21 & n.2 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
355 West Virginia, 2022 WL 2347278, at *21 n.2 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
356 U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 855 F.3d at 417 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
357 Cf. Stephanopoulos, Anti-Carolene Court, supra note 267, at 178.
354
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and described as minimalist, or as something fixable, then that may contribute to a
lack of attention to the decisions and their effects. To the extent people do not
understand or appreciate how the decisions functionally disable administrative
agencies in many important respects, that undermines one possible constraint on
the Supreme Court and courts more generally—public opinion.
CONCLUSION
The new major questions doctrine is an important development in administrative
law and has emerged as a powerful deregulatory tool. We want to close on a broader
suggestion: In addition to its failures as catalogued above, the new major questions
doctrine may work to undermine important theoretical and conceptual justifications for the administrative state that scholars have recently offered. In other words,
while the doctrine is offered as a way to help legitimate the administrative state by
requiring clear congressional authorization for certain agency policies, its existence
may perversely do the opposite.
Consider three explanations for the legitimacy of the administrative state. One,
offered by Professor Daniel Walters, maintains that the administrative state is a
salutary form of governance because it channels political contestation and enables
political dispute resolution within administrative processes.358 In Walters’ telling,
what makes administrative agencies legitimate and beneficial is that they provide
avenues for continued conflict and contestation.359
The major questions doctrine, however, substantially undermines agencies’ ability to act as fora for political disagreements. Instead, under the major question doctrine, when an issue is politically significant, or when there is politically controversy
surrounding an agency policy, then the issue should not be resolved through administrative processes. Instead, it can either be resolved outside of administrative processes through political contestation or in the legislature. By limiting agencies’ ability to act as fora for political contestation, the major questions doctrine undermines
one of the theoretical benefits for administrative governance.
A second justification is the one offered by Professor Nicholas Bagley. Bagley
argued that the legitimacy of the administrative state is derived from its ability to
deliver substantively just and beneficial policies that benefit the public.360 Under
Bagley’s account, what makes administrative agencies legitimate and useful forms
of governance is their ability to provide sensible and beneficial policy solutions to
problems.361
Yet here too, the major questions doctrine undermines agencies’ ability to pursue
policies that further the agencies’ policy goals and concededly address a national
problem. Any of the Court’s three recent major questions cases illustrate why this

Daniel E. Walters, The Administrative Agon: A Democratic Theory for a Conflictual Regulatory State, 132 YALE L.J. __ (forthcoming 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4044675, manuscript at 42-60.
359 See id.
360 See Bagley, supra note 304, at 369-89.
361 See id.
358
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might be. Of course none of the agencies policies—an eviction moratorium, a testing-and-vaccination policy, or generation-shifting rules—was a perfect solution,
and none of them would have completely solved the problems the agencies were
tackling. But all of them would have offered real benefits. And the important point
is that doesn’t matter in the Court’s application of the major questions doctrine. It
doesn’t matter that generation-shifting rules might be the best system for emissions
reduction, and it doesn’t matter that vaccinate-or-test requirements might reduce
the spread and severity of COVID-19 in the workplace. By limiting agencies’ ability
to adopt effective solutions, the major questions doctrine undermines one of the
basis for the legitimacy of administrative governance.
A third and final justification for administrative governance is the one articulated
most recently by Professor Jed Stiglitz. Broadly speaking, it maintains that agency
governance is legitimate because agency rules must be evidence-based and agencies
must give reasons for their decisions. Agencies, unlike Congress, must adopt policies in a manner that is “highly constrained and subject to scrutiny by external reviewers.”362 These procedural requirements exist to create policies that are supported by evidence and shaped by public input.363
Here too, the major questions doctrine minimizes the importance of agency reason-giving and evidence-based decisionmaking. And here too, the Court’s three
recent major questions cases illustrate why this is so. What didn’t matter in those
cases is that the agencies had given reasons and evidentiary support for why generation-shifting rules would reduce air pollution, or had given reasons why a vaccination-and-testing regimen would improve the health of the workforce and the safety
of workplace conditions. By minimizing the significance of agency reason-giving
and evidence-based decisionmaking, the major questions doctrine undermines one
of the basis for the legitimacy of administrative governance.
The major questions doctrine is an important tool in the Court’s anti-regulatory
arsenal. It not only supplies a judicial weapon against regulations and delegations in
circumstances where they are practically needed and effective; it may also undermine the conceptual and theoretical bases for administrative governance. And
maybe that’s the point.

Edward H. Stiglitz, Delegating for Trust, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 653 (2018).
Id. at 655. See also Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On the
Democratic Legitimacy of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2019, 2028, 208789 (2018).
362
363
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